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Abstract
My dissertation consists of three chapters. The first two chapters are about regional
and urban economics, focusing on the cross section of cities. The third chapter is on
international economics. In particular, sudden stop in emerging countries is examined.
In the first chapter, I study housing prices and the comparative advantage of cities.
The spatial concentration of economic activity varies substantially across U.S. cities. In
addition, cities with larger shares of skill-intensive industries have higher housing prices.
Existing theories, however, have almost entirely focused on the relationship between city
size and industrial composition. This chapter proposes a theory of cities that relates
housing prices, spatial sorting, and comparative advantage. There are two ex-ante
identical cities and a continuum of heterogeneous individuals, as well as a continuum
of tradable goods, which differ in their dependence on local skill-intensive differentiated
input components. Each individual chooses an occupation and a location according to
her productivity. Cross-city heterogeneity arises endogenously through the choices made
by freely mobile individuals. In any stable equilibrium, cities organize themselves into
specializing in different sets of tradable goods. Empirically, I find support for my model’s
predictions about the cross section of cities. I extend the model to study the equilibrium
effects of two types of policies: policies that attract skilled workers to particular regions,
and policies that increase housing supply. I find that both types of policies have positive
impacts on local productivity and income, and hence will encourage the growth of cities.
The second chapter provides a spatial explanation for cross-city price differences.
Large cities are more expensive than small cities and the price differences are larger in
non-tradable service goods but smaller in tradable manufacturing goods. Using detailed
component data for 56 individual goods and services collected in 209 U.S. cities in 2010, I
find that a one log-unit rise in city size is associated with a 3.4% increase in non-tradable
price index but only a 1.2% increase in tradable price index. This chapter proposes a
spatial model to explain why relative price of non-tradable goods is higher in large cities.
There are two sectors: tradable manufacturing sector, and nontradable service sector.
An explicit internal structure of the city is introduced: the service sector locates closest
to the center, followed by the manufacturing sector, then by residents. Locations closer
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to the center have a higher land price but a lower transport or commuting cost. In
equilibrium, all agents in the city face this trade-off and choose their optimal location.
The model provides a theoretical microeconomic foundation for the large empirical
literature on cross-city price differences.
The third chapter explores the sudden stops in emerging economies. Financial crises
are accompanied by a large fall in total factor productivity. In emerging economies,
about 40% of domestic credits are provided by banks. Previous theories have largely
focused on the impact of an exogenous change in domestic interest rate on the economy.
In this chapter, I explore the role of banks’ intermediation in exacerbating the allocative
inefficiency. I build a small open economy model in which banks are the only domestic
agents with access to international capital markets. During sudden stops, a shock to
the world interest rate will decrease banks’ credit supply and raise domestic interest
rate on loans. Firms, with working capital financing needs, will experience an increase
in the cost of production. This worsens the misallocation and generates an endogenous
fall in TFP and output. The model is calibrated to Mexico before the 1995 crisis. It
can explain more than half of the fall in TFP.
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Chapter 1
Housing Prices and the
Comparative Advantage of Cities
1.1 Introduction
The spatial concentration of economic activity varies substantially across U.S. cities.
San Jose hosts the production of the most skill-intensive goods, computer and electronic
products, while the largest sector in San Antonio is food manufacturing. In addition,
although these two cities are of similar size, the housing price in San Jose is about twice
as high as in San Antonio. One reason that San Jose has one of the most expensive
housing markets in the U.S. is that it has more skilled workers. Why do workers locate in
cities that are expensive to live in? What is the relationship between housing prices and
skill distribution across cities? Do cities with comparative advantage in skill-intensive
sectors exhibit high housing prices? This paper attempts to answer these fundamental
questions on the spatial variation of housing prices, skill distribution, and industrial
specialization.
Traditional models, pioneered by Henderson (1974), almost entirely emphasize the
relationship between city size and industrial composition. Not until recently have
economists became interested in spatial sorting of individuals across cities (e.g., Davis
and Dingel, 2012). By assuming only one tradable good produced in all cities, these
new models on sorting cannot explain industrial specialization. In addition, little at-
tention has been drawn upon the relation between housing prices and the comparative
1
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advantage of cities.1 This paper integrates housing prices, spatial sorting, and indus-
trial specialization in a theory of cities that can be used to understand the effects of
government policies targeted to specific regions.
More specifically, I develop a model with two ex-ante homogeneous cities. Each city
is endowed with a fixed amount of land, owned by competitive landowners who convert
each unit of land to one unit of housing. There is a continuum of final tradable goods,
each of which is assembled by combining homogeneous labor-intensive components and
a composite of differentiated skill-intensive components, according to a Cobb-Douglas
technology. The final goods can be freely traded between the two cities and they differ
by the share of skill-intensive components, the production of which features monopolis-
tic competition, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). There is a continuum of heterogeneous
individuals, each choosing an occupation - to be either a team leader or a worker - and
a location. More skilled individuals become team leaders, each of whom designs one
variety of skill-intensive components and leads a group of workers to produce. Less
skilled individuals become workers and can produce both labor and skill intensive com-
ponents. Each individual consumes final goods and housing, and chooses her location
to maximize utility.
Cross-city heterogeneity arises endogenously through the choices made by freely mo-
bile individuals. Workers are equally productive and locate in both cities. Team leaders
sort across cities according to their productivity. The city with more and/or highly
skilled team leaders exhibits higher aggregate productivity and comparative advantage
of skill-intensive goods. Since workers obtain the same utility everywhere, free migration
of workers is then associated with a compensating differential, i.e., higher productivity
in the city must be associated with a higher wage rate and hence a higher housing price.
This difference in housing prices between the two cities induces the sorting of team
leaders: only the most talented team leaders will be able to afford to live in the more
expensive city, while less skilled team leaders are better off in the city where housing
price is lower. This sorting reinforces the heterogeneity between cities: in any stable
equilibrium, one city ends up having a higher housing price, more skilled team leaders,
a larger share of aggregate income and population, and a comparative advantage in
1Throughout this paper, I use the housing price as an approximation for urban cost. It turns out
that cross-city price differences can be mainly explained by the housing price differences. See Appendix
A for detailed data and estimations.
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tradable sectors that rely more heavily on skill-intensive components.
I use the model to study the effects of government policies targeted to specific
regions. Local governments invest in education and offer financial incentives to attract
productive firms. These aim at raising local income by increasing the number of skilled
workers. These financial incentives are pervasive (Kline and Moretti, 2013; Busso,
Gregory, and Kline, 2013) and come in many forms such as cash grants, loans, and
tax breaks. In addition, local land regulations such as zoning restrictions can impact
the growth of cities. The limited expansion of the regions around New York, Boston,
and San Francisco is attributable to stringent land-use regulations, which generally lead
to high housing prices and limit the ability of workers to access the highly productive
technologies available in these cities. To analyze the effects of these local policies, I
extend my model to incorporate both local financial incentives and land regulations. I
find that a subsidy to the team leader’s income in the less productive city attracts more
skilled migrants and helps the city grow. On the other hand, a policy that increases the
housing supply makes the productive city become even more productive as more skilled
individuals move there because of the affordable housing. Both policies have positive
effects on local productivity and income.
Empirically, I find support for my model’s predictions about the cross section of
cities. As in the traditional trade model, each city produces a subset of goods. By
looking at the U.S. data, I find that cities with high housing prices specialize in producing
more skill-intensive goods, which is exactly what my model predicts. In addition, the
model’s result regarding the spatial sorting of team leaders also implies an empirical
pattern in the top-tail distribution of skills: the skill level in the top percentiles of cities
with high housing prices in general is higher than anywhere else. Therefore, cities such
as New York, San Jose, and San Francisco are the ultimate places of top CEOs, top
lawyers, top engineers, and many other professionals. This allows me to conclude that
the observed pattern of skills, the fatter tails at the top of the distribution, supports the
spatial sorting of team leaders in my model. Finally, I look at the empirical evidence
on the effects of the two types of policies examined in this paper: increasing housing
supply and local financial incentives. Data show that cities with highly regulated land
markets and those with more skilled workers exhibit higher housing prices, income, and
population. This is consistent with my model’s prediction that both types of policies
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have positive effects on the growth of cities.
The model matches a broad set of facts from the empirical literature. It gener-
ates asymmetric outcomes without relying on assumptions of asymmetries in workers’
mobility or cities’ fundamental characteristics. These asymmetric differences are ac-
companied by cross-city differences in wages, housing prices and productivity (Glaeser,
2008; Moretti, 2012). Recent work by Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) and
Gibbons, Overman, and Pelkonen (2010) provides evidence that spatial wage variation
is attributable to spatial sorting of heterogeneous workers. Bacolod, Blum, and Strange
(2009) and Glaeser and Resseger (2010) find that more talented individuals move to
cities where urban costs are higher, which is a prediction of my model. In particular,
Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014) document the fact that skill distribution
has thicker tails in large cities, which supports my model’s prediction that the skill level
at the top of the skill distribution is higher in cities where housing prices are high.
A distinguishing aspect of the theory is that it features a rich set of elements in
a model of cities - housing prices, industrial specialization, individual’s occupational
choice, and spatial sorting - which has not been studied before. The most closely
related paper is Davis and Dingel (2012), who develop a system of cities model in which
idea exchange is an explicit economic decision. Their model also features occupational
choice and spatial sorting: skilled workers produce tradable goods and unskilled workers
produce non-tradable goods. In their paper, skilled workers devote time to exchange
ideas with each other to raise their productivity, and highly skilled workers benefit
more by sorting to large cities because these cities exhibit better learning environments.
Since there are only one tradable good and one non-tradable good, their model does
not capture the industrial specialization across cities. By having a continuum of final
tradable goods, my model yields the spatial pattern of industries.
The paper is related to several strands of the literature. The model builds on and
expands the large theoretical literature in international trade on comparative advan-
tage. It extends traditional Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models in that comparative
advantage is determined endogenously and depends on the available variety of local dif-
ferentiated input components. This extension is more in line with Matsuyama (2013),
who proposes a symmetric-breaking model of trade with a large but finite number of
ex-ante identical countries. In his paper, productivity differences across countries arise
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endogenously through firms’ entry and he shows that in equilibrium, countries sort
themselves into specializing in different sets of tradable goods. My approach is similar,
with the difference that the endogenous comparative advantage arises from the spatial
sorting of individuals.
The model also contributes to the literature on the specialization of regions in eco-
nomic geography. Cities with high housing prices produce those goods that are more
skill intensive. This kind of specialization has not been studied before, as prior theories
of cities have focused on the two extreme cases: either a city contains only one industry,
or it hosts all the modeled industries. One exception is Davis and Dingel (2013), who
suggest an urban hierarchy in terms of sectors and skills. In their theory, large cities
produce all of the goods that are produced in smaller cities plus additional skill-intensive
items that are not made in smaller cities. Namely, larger cities have a strict superset of
goods produced in smaller cities. My model does not yield such a hierarchy: each city
produces a different set of goods and there are no goods produced in both cities. With
this type of specialization, the variation of industrial composition across cities becomes
clear: some cities produce skill-intensive goods while others produce labor-intensive
goods. Moreover, the model is related to the work on the pattern of specialization that
emerges from symmetric fundamentals.2 Krugman and Venables (1995), for example,
develop a model in which there is no inherent difference among countries, but the world
economy organizes itself into a core-periphery pattern. In their model, however, factors
of production are immobile.
The theoretical literature about the spatial sorting across cities is more limited. In
recent work, Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud (2014) look at the complemen-
tarities between agglomeration, sorting, and selection to explain why large cities are
more productive. In particular, they construct an equilibrium with a system of talent-
homogeneous cities. They model location choice and occupational choice in two steps:
each individual chooses where to locate based on her talent, then upon moving to a
city, each individual draws a “serendipity”, which, together with her talent, determine
her occupational choice. My paper differs from theirs in that occupational choice and
location choice occur simultaneously. Another paper on sorting by Eeckhout, Pinheiro,
2See Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) and Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008) in economic
geography and Ethier (1982a), Helpman (1986), and Matsuyama (1996) in international trade.
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and Schmidheiny (2014) shows that the different degrees of complementarities between
the skills of workers determine the equilibrium skill distribution across cities. More
specifically, large cities disproportionately attract both high and low skilled workers
when skill complementarities are stronger between more extreme skills. My findings
are consistent with their theory, in that cities with high housing prices have fat tails at
the top of the skill distribution. All of these existing papers emphasize sorting between
cities of different sizes, while my paper investigates sorting between cities with different
housing prices.
Finally, the model complements the recent work that estimates the effects of local
policies that impact the growth of cities. Gaubert (2014) studies the sorting of hetero-
geneous firms across locations: firms’ location choice is driven by a trade-off between
gains in productivity, local level of input prices, and the existence of local subsidies.
She then uses the estimated model to quantify the aggregate effects of local subsidies
and land regulations. My model differs in that I look at the sorting of heterogeneous
individuals and I analyze the local effects of the two types of policies. These local effects
have been studied in recent empirical work. Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2013) assess the
efficiency of the federal program, Empowerment Zones, which offers grants, tax cred-
its, and other benefits to areas that have experienced poverty and/or high emigration3;
Mayer, Mayneris, and Py (2012) empirically study the impact of a French enterprise
zones program on establishment location decisions.
In what follows, Section 1.2 introduces the baseline model, in which land supply
is fixed in each city and no local government policies are involved. Section 1.3 derives
multiple equilibria analysis and conducts a numerical exercise of solving the asymmetric
equilibrium. Section 1.4 presents two extensions of the baseline model: introducing a
housing construction sector and a local subsidy on team leader’s income. It also reports
results from the two policy experiments. Section 1.5 presents detailed empirical facts
on industrial specialization and skill distribution across cities with different housing
prices, and studies the effects of the two types of policies empirically. Finally, Section
1.6 concludes.
3Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) also study the economic impact of Empowerment Zones, among other
things.
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1.2 The Model
The economy consists of two ex-ante identical cities: City 1 and City 2. Each city
is endowed with a fixed amount of land, which is normalized to 1. Land is owned
by competitive landowners outside the economy, who convert each unit of land to one
unit of housing. There is a continuum of individuals, the mass of which is L; each
choosing an occupation, to be either a team leader or a worker, and a location, either
City 1 or City 2. Individuals are heterogeneous in their productivity ϕ, with cumulative
distribution function F (ϕ). Following the literature, I assume that the productivity ϕ is
Pareto distributed with a lower bound ϕ and shape parameter δ. There is a continuum
of final tradable goods sectors s ∈ [0, 1], each of which is different in its share of two
types of local components: homogeneous labor-intensive components and a continuum
of skill-intensive components. Labor-intensive components are produced by workers
only, while skill-intensive components are produced by workers using the technology
provided by team leaders. Throughout this paper, I assume zero transport costs and
no other impediments to trade.
1.2.1 Final Goods Sectors
Each final good s ∈ [0, 1] is costlessly assembled by combining labor-intensive compo-
nents and skill-intensive components, according to a Cobb-Douglas production technol-
ogy with constant returns to scale. Aggregate output in city j ∈ {1, 2} by sector s is
given by
Yj(s) = Aj(s)ME,j(s)γ(s)ML,j(s)1−γ(s), (1.2.1)
where Aj(s) is sector-specific scale parameter, ME,j(s) is the sector s demand for skill-
intensive components, ML,j(s) is the sector s demand for labor-intensive components,
and γ(s) ∈ [0, 1] is the share of skill-intensive components used in the final production
by sector s. This share of skill-intensive components in sector s, γ(s), varies across
sectors. The final tradable goods are ordered so that γ(s) is increasing in s ∈ [0, 1].
That is, higher indexed sectors rely more heavily on skill-intensive components.
The location of each sector s is determined through competition, resulting in the
price P (s) of each final good s equaling the lowest unit cost of production. Let Cj (s)
and Sj ⊆ [0, 1] denote the unit cost of production of sector s and the set of sectors active
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in city j, respectively, then it holds that P (s) = Cj (s) if s ∈ Sj .
The differentiated skill-intensive components enter the production technology with
constant elasticity of substitution 1 + 1/ε, with ε > 0,
ME,j(s) =
[ˆ
Ωj
xj (i, s)
1
1+ε di
]1+ε
, (1.2.2)
where xj(i, s) is the amount of variety i used by sector s in city j and Ωj is the en-
dogenously determined set of varieties of skill-intensive components produced in city
j. Aggregate increasing returns arise here from the productive advantage of sharing a
wider variety of differentiated inputs. In other words, an increase in the labor input of
sector s must be associated with more skill-intensive components, and final producers
become more productive when they have access to a wider range of varieties.
1.2.2 Labor-Intensive Components
The local labor-intensive components are produced by workers. Labor is the only input.
This market is competitive and firms need one unit of labor to produce each unit of
output.
PL,j = wj
is the condition that price equals marginal cost, where wj is the wage rate of workers.
1.2.3 Skill-Intensive Components
As in Ethier (1982b), local skill-intensive components production is characterized by
monopolistic competition a` la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Each team leader designs one
variety and leads a team of workers to produce. Therefore, Ωj , the set of varieties, also
denotes the set of team leaders and i refers to a team leader, or equivalently, the variety
she produces. Output of variety i in city j is
xj(i) = ϕj(i)lj(i) , (1.2.3)
where lj(i) is the number of workers needed for the production of variety i and ϕj(i) is
the team leader i’s productivity.
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Minimizing production costs in the final goods sectors subject to technology in (1.2.1)
and (1.2.2) gives the demand for skill-intensive components by sector s:
xj(i, s) =
[
pj(i)
Pj
]− 1+ε
ε
ME,j(s), (1.2.4)
where Pj ≡
[´
Ωj pj(i)
− 1
ε di
]−ε
is the price index of the aggregate of skill-intensive com-
ponents in city j. The price for each variety i in city j is then
pj(i) = (1 + ε)
wj
ϕj(i)
. (1.2.5)
Output of variety i can then be rewritten as
xj(i) =
ˆ
s∈Sj
xj(i, s)ds =
ˆ
s∈Sj
[
pj(i)
Pj
]− 1+ε
ε
ME,j(s)ds, (1.2.6)
Let Y be the economy-wide income excluding land rents. Equal weights of industries in
preferences and the production technology of the final goods sectors then imply that two
market clearing conditions, one for the final goods and the other for the skill-intensive
components, are consolidated into
ˆ
Sj
ME,j(s)ds =
αY
´
Sj γ(s)ds
Pj
= αY Γj
Pj
, (1.2.7)
where α is the expenditure share of final goods in consumer’s preference, and Γj ≡´
Sj γ(s)ds denotes the aggregate share of skill-intensive components used in the final
goods production in city j. A higher Γj means either the set of sectors active in city
j, S, has a larger measure, or the available sectors in city j are more dependent on
the skill-intensive components, i.e., larger γ’s. Hence, Γj measures the market size or
the demand of skill-intensive components in city j. Then αY Γj represents the sum of
expenditures for the skill-intensive components in city j, which is also the consumer
demand. Using this equation and (1.2.5), I can rewrite (1.2.6) as
xj(i) =
(
ϕj(i)
Φj
)1+ 1
ε αY Γj
Pj
, (1.2.8)
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where Φj =
[´
Ωj ϕj(i)
1
ε di
]ε
is the aggregate productivity in city j. Note here more team
leaders in a city (i.e., a larger measure of Ω) and/or more skilled team leaders (i.e., on
average larger ϕ’s) imply a higher aggregate productivity. Using (1.2.5) and (1.2.8), the
price index can be rewritten as
Pj =
(1 + ε)wj
Φj
. (1.2.9)
Rather than being paid a flat wage as workers, each team leader i gets paid the
profits of producing variety i, which can be written as
pij(i) = pj(i)xj(i)− wjxj(i)
ϕj(i)
= αε1 + ε
(
ϕj(i)
Φj
) 1
ε
Y Γj . (1.2.10)
Team leader i’s income increases with the market size of skill-intensive components in
city j (Γj) . Income also depends on team leader’s own productivity relative to the ag-
gregate productivity, ϕj(i)/Φj . In other words, given team leader i’s own productivity,
she would like to locate in a city with high demand for skill-intensive components (large
Γ) and low aggregate productivity (low Φ). This combination, however, does not hap-
pen in equilibrium: large market size is associated with high aggregate productivity.
Therefore, when a team leader chooses her location, she faces this tradeoff: a large mar-
ket also means toughness because she has to compete with other higher skilled team
leaders.
The unit production cost for final tradable good s can thus be expressed as
Cj(s) = ξ(s)w1−γ(s)j P
γ(s)
j = ξ(s) (1 + ε)
γ(s)wjΦ−γ(s)j . (1.2.11)
This equation shows that, for each sector s, given w, a higher Φ (because more team
leaders and/or better team leaders) will reduce the unit production cost in all tradables,
which captures the productivity gains from varieties. And this productivity gain is
greater for higher-indexed sectors. The comparative advantage is then captured by the
ratio of the costs, C1 (s) /C2 (s) .
Before proceeding, note that the production process has elements of both the Ricar-
dian and Heckscher-Ohlin models with a continuum of goods. The features that labor is
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the only input for the production of both skill and labor intensive components and that
comparative advantage is attributable to the relative wage structure between two cities
are consistent with the Ricardian model (Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson, 1977).
Moreover, final goods are indexed in order of increasing skill intensity, which is more
similar to the Heckscher-Ohlin model (Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson, 1980).
1.2.4 Individuals
Individuals are ex-ante heterogeneous in their productivity ϕ. Depending on this pro-
ductivity, each individual chooses her occupation and location freely to maximize her
utility. The decisions of occupation and location occur simultaneously, nonetheless I
will start the discussion of occupational choice first. Let Uj(ϕ) and yj(ϕ) denote the
utility and income of an individual with productivity ϕ residing in city j.
Occupational Choice
Suppose that an individual chooses to reside in city j. Then she chooses the occupation
to maximize her income. If she chooses to be a worker, she inelastically supplies one unit
of labor. Workers are assumed to be equally productive and thus she receives a constant
wage wj . If she chooses to be a team leader, she supplies knowledge and earn pij(ϕ)
depending on her productivity. Thus her income is given by yj(ϕ) = max {pij(ϕ), wj} .
There exists a productivity cutoff level ϕ∗j , defined by pij(ϕ∗j ) = wj , such that all in-
dividuals with productivity above ϕ∗j become team leaders and all individuals with
productivity below ϕ∗j become workers. Using (1.2.10), this productivity cutoff is given
by
ϕ∗j = Φj
(
1 + ε
αε
wj
Y Γj
)ε
. (1.2.12)
We can see that this cutoff is higher (or equivalently, it is harder to become a team
leader) when aggregate productivity Φ is higher, since it is more difficult to compete
against more or better team leaders. It is also harder to become a team leader when
wage rate of workers is high (i.e., outside option is more attractive), and when Γ is low
(less demand for skill-intensive components).
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Residential Choice
Each individual chooses her location to maximize her utility. For the given income
yj(ϕ), each individual consumes final goods and housing:
Uj(ϕ) = max{cj(s,ϕ)}s∈[0,1], hj(ϕ) exp
[
α
´ 1
0 ln (cj (s, ϕ)) ds
]
hj (ϕ)1−α ,
s.t.´ 1
0 P (s)cj (s, ϕ) ds+Rjhj (ϕ) = yj(ϕ),
(1.2.13)
where α is the expenditure share of final goods in consumer’s preference, cj (s, ϕ) denotes
the quantity of final goods consumed by an individual with ϕ residing in city j, hj (ϕ)
is the quantity of housing consumed, and Rj is city j’s housing price. Without loss of
generality, I measure the size of (a set of) sectors by the expenditure share of the goods
produced in these sectors. With this indexing, the size of sectors whose γ is less than
or equal to γ(s) is equal to s, and a city’s share in the economy-wide income is equal to
the measure of the tradables for which the city ends up having comparative advantage
in equilibrium.
The productivity composition and population size of a city are endogenously deter-
mined. The population of city j, Lj , is given by
Lj =
ˆ ∞
ϕ
Lj(ϕ)dϕ, (1.2.14)
where Lj(ϕ) is the population with productivity ϕ in city j. In equilibrium, all individ-
uals must live in a city. The adding-up constraint for each type of productivity thus
requires that
Lf(ϕ) = L1(ϕ) + L2(ϕ), ∀ϕ ∈ [ϕ,∞), (1.2.15)
where f(ϕ) is the probability distribution of productivity. Equation (1.2.15) states that
the mass of individuals with productivity ϕ across both cities must be equal to the mass
of individuals with productivity ϕ in the population. Summing equation (1.2.15) across
all productivity types then implies satisfying the full population condition of the model.
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1.3 Equilibrium Analysis
I now discuss the properties and implications of the model. To help with the intuition,
I start with a single-city version of the model. This can be viewed as the equilibrium
allocation of a city in autarky in an economy with multiple cities.
1.3.1 Single-City (Autarky) Equilibrium
In the one-city economy, markets for final goods, the two types of components, and
labor clear, and the population constraints are satisfied. The city must produce all the
consumption goods in the absence of trade,
P (s) = C(s) = ξ(s) (1 + ε)γ(s)wΦ−γ(s) ∀s ∈ [0, 1] ,
and the market clearing condition for the skill-intensive components is
ˆ 1
0
PME(s)ds = αY
ˆ 1
0
γ(s)ds = αY ΓA,
where ΓA ≡ ´ 10 γ(s)ds. In autarky, the share of skill-intensive components in aggregate
income is equal to the average share of skill-intensive components across all the final
goods sectors.
Labor in the city is supplied by workers, i.e., all individuals with productivity less
than ϕ∗. City labor supply is then equal to LS = L
´ ϕ∗
ϕ dF (ϕ). Since workers are involved
in the production of both types of components, there are two sources of labor demand:
sector s spends 100 (1− γ(s)) % of its total revenue on labor, and each skill-intensive
variety (team leader i) spends wx(i)ϕ(i) on labor. Therefore, labor market clearing condition
gives
α
(
1− ΓA
)
Y + wL
ˆ ∞
ϕ∗
x(ϕ)
ϕ
dF (ϕ) = wLS .
Using (1.2.8) and (1.2.9), this condition can be simplified as
α
(
1− ΓA + Γ
A
1 + ε
)
Y = wLS . (1.3.1)
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This labor market clearing condition implies that aggregate workers’ income is a con-
stant share of output. Aggregate productivity, as defined in (1.2.8), can be rewritten as
Φ =
[
L
ˆ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕ
1
ε dF (ϕ)
]ε
. (1.3.2)
Proposition 1. (Existence and Productivity Cutoff) Given population, L, and
its productivity distribution, F (·), the equilibrium in autarky exists, is unique, and the
productivity cutoff for being a team leader does not depend on city population.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind this result can be seen in equation (1.3.1). Workers (and thus
team leaders) receive a constant share of city output. Hence, keeping the distribution of
individual productivity constant, a city hosts the same proportion of workers and team
leaders regardless of its size.
1.3.2 Two-City Equilibria
There are two classes of equilibria for the two-city economy: a symmetric equilibrium
in which both cities have the same set of varieties of skill-intensive components, and an
asymmetric equilibria in which this endogenous variable is different across cities. The
latter are the empirically relevant class, since there is spatial variation in productivities
and sets of goods produced across cities. I start with the symmetric equilibrium, how-
ever, to illustrate why it is unstable before analyzing the properties of the asymmetric
equilibria.
Symmetric Equilibrium
Since my model has symmetric fundamentals, there always exists a symmetric equilib-
rium. In such an equilibrium, the endogenous variable, the set of skill-intensive varieties
of components, Ω, is also the same in both cities. This means that both cities have the
same number of team leaders and all skill types are equally represented in both cities.
Thus aggregate productivity is the same, Φ1 = Φ2, and both cities have the same
prices, w1 = w2, and R1 = R2. In this symmetric equilibrium, which replicates the
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autarky equilibrium in each city, the unit production cost of each tradable good is equal
across the two cities, C1(s) = C2(s) ∀s ∈ [0, 1] . Therefore, consumers everywhere are
indifferent as to which city they buy the goods from. In other words, the patterns of
trade are indeterminate. If exactly 50% of the economy-wide income Y is spent on each
city’s final goods, and if this spending is distributed in such a way that the production of
skill-intensive components in each city ends up receiving exactly ΓA/2 of the economy-
wide spending, then the symmetric equilibrium, in which both cities have the same set
of skill-intensive components, would emerge. This equilibrium, however, is unstable in
that a small perturbation that results in one city is more productive than the other
(Φ1 > Φ2 or Φ1 < Φ2) will break the symmetric equilibrium.4
Asymmetric Equilibria
The stability of an equilibrium in a two-city model requires that the endogenous variable,
Ωj , is different across cities. To discuss the properties of such an equilibrium, suppose
that City 2 has more skill-intensive varieties of components (i.e., more team leaders).
Then it immediately implies that, the aggregate productivity Φ, as defined in (1.2.8),
is higher in City 2, i.e., Φ1 < Φ2.
Comparative Advantage
Using equation (1.2.11), the relative cost of production in sector s is given by
C1(s)
C2(s)
=
(
w1
w2
)(Φ1
Φ2
)−γ(s)
, (1.3.3)
which is monotonically increasing in s. The pattern of specialization under a set of
specified parameters is shown in Figure 1.1. This implies that City 1 has comparative
advantage in lower-indexed goods and City 2 has comparative advantage in higher-
indexed goods. There exists a threshold, S, which summarizes the specialization pattern
of final goods across the two cities. Because goods are ordered in such a way that
higher-indexed goods rely more heavily on skill-intensive components, City 1 produces
4Any microfoundations in which the city with a larger set of team leaders exhibits a higher endogenous
value of Φ will result in symmetry-breaking. One example could be a perturbation on preference so that
consumers prefer to buy the goods from one of the two cities.
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and exports more labor-intensive goods in [0,S), while City 2 produces and exports
more skill-intensive goods in (S,1], where S ∈ (0, 1) is defined by
C1(S)
C2(S)
=
(
w1
w2
)(Φ1
Φ2
)−γ(S)
= 1. (1.3.4)
That is, sector S has the same cost in both cities. This means that the equilibrium
wage rates for workers can be expressed as
w1
w2
=
(Φ1
Φ2
)γ(S)
< 1. (1.3.5)
Thus, due to the higher productivity in City 2, worker’s wage is higher in City 2,
w1 < w2.
The endogenous comparative advantage arises from the productivity difference be-
tween the two cities. Higher productivity in City 2 will lower the cost of final tradables
that use more skill-intensive components. On the other hand, since PL,j = wj , City 1 has
comparative advantage in sectors that rely more heavily on labor-intensive components
because City 1 has a lower labor cost.
Individual Behavior
There is a population of workers located in each city. In equilibrium, each of these
workers obtains the same utility, so the utility maximization problem (1.2.13) implies
that the spatial difference in their wage rates compensates for the spatial difference in
housing prices:
w1
w2
=
(
R1
R2
)1−α
. (1.3.6)
Not surprisingly, R1 < R2, i.e., the more productive city has a higher housing price.
This fact has been documented extensively in the literature. Albouy (2008) finds that
for given output prices, more productive cities pay higher rents and wages.
Lemma 1. (Occupational Choice) In any asymmetric equilibrium, the productivity
cutoff for being a team leader is the same across cities. That is, ϕ∗1 = ϕ∗2 = ϕ∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Lemma 1 simply states that if an individual chooses to be a worker in one city,
then she cannot become a team leader by changing her location. The intuition behind
this result can be seen from (1.2.12). It is the outcome of two offsetting forces. City
2 has a higher aggregate productivity (Φ) and a higher wage rate (w). These capture
the crowding out effects, which raise the cutoff. At the same time, the market size of
the skill-intensive components (Γ) is also larger in City 2, which lowers the cutoff and
captures the demand effect. It turns out that these two kinds of effects exactly offset
each other in my framework. The reason behind this can be found in equation (1.2.10).
The optimal pricing strategy is a proportional mark-up over wage (i.e., equation 1.2.5),
due to Dixit-Stiglitz form of demand. The constant returns to scale at the level of the
production of skill-intensive components ensure that cost is proportional to wage rate.
Therefore, (1.2.10) implies that team leader’s income, pij (ϕ), is proportional to worker’s
wage, wj . In other words, a city with a higher wj has a proportionally higher pij (ϕ) .
The cutoff ϕ∗, which is defined as pij (ϕ∗) = wj , thus, does not depend on j. The upper
panel of Figure 1.2 shows a numerical illustration of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Given her individual productivity ϕ, a team leader can always get higher
income by locating to the more productive city. That is, pi2 (ϕ) > pi1 (ϕ) for all ϕ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This comes directly from Lemma 1, which states that the crowding out forces, a
high Φ and a high w in City 2, exactly offset the demand effect, a high Γ. Equation
(1.2.10) shows that the only forces show up in the team leader’s income are Φ and Γ,
and thus the demand effect in City 2 outweighs the crowding out effect. This can be
seen in the upper panel of Figure 1.2, in which pi2 (ϕ) is above pi1 (ϕ) for all ϕ. Although
team leaders can get higher income by moving to City 2, not all team leaders locate
there in equilibrium, because the high housing price in City 2 makes it unaffordable for
some team leaders. To see this, the indirect utility of team leaders with productivity ϕ
who locate in city j can be expressed as
vj (P,Rj , yj) = pij (ϕ)
(
α
P
)α(1− α
Rj
)1−α
.
Then there exists ϕ∗∗ such that ϕ∗∗ > ϕ∗ and team leaders with productivity ϕ∗∗ are
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indifferent to which city they reside in. The cutoff ϕ∗∗ is defined as
pi1 (ϕ∗∗)
R1−α1
= pi2 (ϕ
∗∗)
R1−α2
. (1.3.7)
Proposition 2. (Spatial Sorting) Individuals with ϕ ≥ ϕ∗∗ reside in City 2 and
become team leaders. Those with ϕ such that ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗∗ reside in City 1 and become
team leaders. Workers consist of individuals with ϕ < ϕ∗ and reside in both cities.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind this is that only the most skilled team leaders are able to pay
the high housing price in City 2. Less skilled team leaders strictly prefer to be in City
1 because their income gain by locating to City 2 is not large enough to compensate
the housing price difference. The property that more skilled individuals sort into cities
where housing prices are higher and their rewards must be relatively higher is consistent
with several key features of data documented in the literature (Wheeler, 2001; Glaeser
and Resseger, 2010; Dahl, 2002). The lower panel of Figure 1.2 illustrates an example
of sorting under the specified parameters.
The computation of the asymmetric equilibrium in which City 2 is more productive
can be summarized as a fixed-point problem of S. The analytical computation, which
is described in Appendix A, proceeds in two steps. First, given the spatial distribution
of final goods, S, the system of an equilibrium is determined by two equations and
two unknowns, ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗. All other variables are expressed as functions of these two
productivity cutoffs and S. The second step is to pin down S using the comparative
advantage condition, i.e., S must be the solution to equation (1.3.4).
The population of city j is endogenously determined through spatial sorting. Let
LE,j denotes the number of team leaders in city j, then LE,1 = L (F (ϕ∗∗)− F (ϕ∗)) ,
and LE,2 = L (1− F (ϕ∗∗)) . The total number of workers in both cities is LW = F (ϕ∗) .
Population in city j can be written as
Lj = LE,j + λjLW ,
where λj denotes the share of workers in city j. Here, LE,j and LW are functions of
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the two productivity cutoffs. In addition, λj is also endogenously determined and is a
function of S. Appendix A gives the detailed computation of population Lj . It turns
out that L1 < L2, as expected. The more productive city is larger in terms of size. In
the numerical example described in the next section, City 2 has a larger number of both
team leaders and workers.
The intuitive mechanism in the model is summarized as follows: suppose that City
2 has a larger set of skill-intensive components. City 2 is thus more productive and
has a higher wage rate. The free mobility of workers results in City 2 having a higher
housing price. This induces the sorting of team leaders. Only the most skilled team
leaders will locate in City 2 because of the higher housing price. Lower skilled team
leaders are better off in City 1. This sorting reinforces the equilibrium outcomes of the
heterogeneity between cities. City 2 is more productive, has a higher housing price,
and has comparative advantage of final goods that rely more heavily on skill-intensive
components.
Recall that I began the analysis by assuming that City 2 has more skill-intensive
varieties of components. By assuming that City 1 has more skill-intensive varieties of
components instead, I can obtain another equilibrium, which is the mirror-image of the
above equilibrium, where the positions of the two cities are reversed.
The fact that sorting leads to higher productivity and higher housing prices is exactly
what the empirical literature finds (Diamond, 2013). In this model, I do not have perfect
sorting. Workers locate in both cities, while only team leaders sort. This is consistent
with empirical findings, as cities that are more productive overall also contain lots of
workers with low productivity (Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, and Roux, 2012;
Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Roux, 2012).
A Numerical Example
The numerical results show that an asymmetric equilibrium is unique in the sense that
there is only one interior sorting equilibrium. Table 1.1 gives the specified parameter
values, and the source of how these parameters are chosen.
Motivated by the findings of Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud (2014), I use
their estimated value of ε = 0.05, which is within the usual range in the literature.5
5See Glaeser and Resseger (2010), and Rosenthal and Strange (2004).
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Table 1.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Source
ε 0.05 Behrens et al. (2014)
α 0.76 Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011)
ϕ 1 Basic Pareto distribution
δ 1 Behrens et al. (2014)
Y 1 Normalized to 1
L 1 Normalized to 1
The expenditure share α of final goods is set to 0.76, as Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011)
find that housing expenditure is on average constant across different cities, and they
estimated expenditure share on housing is 0.24. The lower bound ϕ of the productivity
distribution is set to 1, as in the basic Pareto distribution. The shape parameter of the
Pareto distribution, δ, is also set to 1. As in Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud
(2014), the distribution of city sizes is endogenous to the sorting of heterogeneous indi-
viduals in a static spatial equilibrium, and if productivity follows a Pareto distribution,
the size distribution of cities is also Pareto. The economy-wide income excluding land
rents, Y, is normalized to 1. The mass of individuals in the economy, L, is also normal-
ized to 1. The share of skill-intensive components in the final goods production, γ (s) ,
is assumed equal to s for all s ∈ [0, 1] .
The solution of the asymmetric equilibrium is summarized by Figures 1.1 and 1.2.
Figure 1.1 shows that the relative cost of production, C1 (s) /C2 (s) , is monotonically
increasing in s. There actually exists a threshold S such that City 1 specializes in
producing more labor-intensive goods in [0,S) while City 2 specializes in more skill-
intensive goods in (S,1]. Here S = 0.3319 implies that Γ1 < Γ2. That is, City 2
has a larger market size of skill-intensive components. In other words, City 2 has a
greater demand for goods that rely more on skill-intensive components. Thus, Y2 =
αY (1− S) > αY S = Y1, size of City 2 is larger in terms of income.
The upper panel of Figure 1.2 illustrates the occupational choice of individuals.
As already noted before, wage rate w is flat since workers are equally productive and
their income does not depend on their productivity ϕ. Team leader’s income pij (ϕ)
is monotonically increasing in ϕ. The productivity cutoff between team leaders and
workers in City 1, ϕ∗1, is where the curve pi1 (ϕ) intersects with wage rate w1, as shown
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Figure 1.1: Comparative Advantage and Pattern of Specialization in the Two-City World
 
 
 
 
 
City 1 produces 
and exports 
City 2 produces 
and exports 
22
Figure 1.2: Occupational Choice and Spatial Sorting in an Asymmetric Equilibrium
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in the figure. As in Lemma 1, higher w in City 2 leads to a proportionally higher pi (ϕ)
in City 2. The threshold at which the two curves meet does not change.
The lower panel of Figure 1.2 gives the spatial sorting of individuals. The first
productivity cutoff ϕ∗ comes from the occupational choice given by the upper panel of
Figure 1.2. Individuals with ϕ lower than this ϕ∗ are workers, and since they are equally
productive in both cities, they are indifferent to which city they reside in. The second
productivity cutoff comes from the condition that a team leader with productivity ϕ∗∗
is indifferent to which city she resides in,
v1 (P,R1, y1)
v2 (P,R2, y2)
= pi1 (ϕ) /R
1−α
1
pi2 (ϕ) /R1−α2
,
and this ratio of indirect utilities equals to 1 at ϕ∗∗. As shown in the lower panel of
Figure 1.2, the ratio of utilities conditional on choosing to become a team leader is
monotonically decreasing in ϕ. In other words, with a low productivity, a team leader
gets a higher utility by locating in City 1. But as her productivity increases, she is
better off by moving to City 2. The threshold at which she is indifferent is where this
curve achieves a value of 1.
1.4 Multi-City Equilibria
Now suppose there are J cities, J ∈ Z+. Note first that the same logic behind the
instability of the symmetric equilibrium in the two-city economy implies that no two
cities have the same set of skill-intensive varieties in any stable equilibrium. Without
loss of generality, cities can be thus ranked in such a way that the measure of the set of
varieties, {Ωj}Jj=1, is monotonically increasing in j.6 I start with the equilibria without
this strict ranking of cities, however, to illustrate why such equilibria are unstable.
1.4.1 Unstable Equilibria without Strict Ranking of Cities
There are equilibria in which some cities have the same set of skill-intensive varieties.
Without strict ranking, {Ωj}Jj=1 is merely non-decreasing in j. The logic of symmetric
6Thus, the subscript j indicates the position of a city in a particular equilibrium, not the identity of
the city.
24
equilibrium in the two-city economy carries over to the case of J > 2. Suppose for some
j, Φj = Φj+1, i.e., there are two cities that have the same number of team leaders and
all skill types are equally represented. Then it implies that for some j,
Cj (s)
Cj+1 (s)
= wj
wj+1
= 1,
∀s ∈ [0, 1] . These two cities have the same cost of producing each good s. For a
positive measure of goods, the consumers would be indifferent between buying from jth
or (j + 1)th city. Thus it implies the same argument as in the case of J = 2 that this
class of equilibria is unstable.
1.4.2 Stable Multi-City Equilibrium
The stability of equilibrium requires that no two cities share the same set of endogenous
variable, Ωj . Cities can be ranked such that {Ωj}Jj=1 is strictly increasing in j.
Comparative Advantage
From (1.2.11), the relative cost of producing good s between the jth and the (j + 1)th
cities can be written as
Cj (s)
Cj+1 (s)
=
(
wj
wj+1
)(
Φj
Φj+1
)−γ(s)
,
which is increasing in s for any j = 1, 2, ..., J − 1. In other words, a city with more or
better team leaders (a larger Φ) has comparative advantage in higher-indexed goods,
which rely more heavily on skill-intensive components. Wage rates {wj}Jj=1 also adjust
in equilibrium so that each city becomes the lowest cost producer of a positive measure
of goods. This implies that there is a sequence {Sj}J−1j=1 , which can summarize the
specialization pattern of final goods. The sequence {Sj}J−1j=1 is defined by
Cj (Sj)
Cj+1 (Sj)
=
(
wj
wj+1
)(
Φj
Φj+1
)−γ(Sj)
= 1, j = 1, 2, ..., J − 1,
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Figure 1.3: Comparative Advantage and Patterns of Specialization in the Multiple-City
World
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which is increasing in j. It implies that the borderline sector, Sj , could be produced and
exported by either jth or (j + 1)th city because the cost of producing the good Sj is
the same in both cities.
As shown in Figure 1.3, the final tradable goods are partitioned into J subintervals of
positive measure such that the city j becomes the lowest cost producer of s ∈ (Sj−1, Sj) .
The equilibrium wages can be written as
wj
wj+1
=
(
Φj
Φj+1
)γ(Sj)
< 1 j = 1, 2, ..., J − 1.
Therefore, the wage sequence, {wj}Jj=1 is also increasing in j. That is, more productive
city has a higher wage rate.
Individual Behavior
With J > 2 cities, there is a population of workers located in each city. In equilibrium,
housing prices adjust to make each worker indifferent between locating in any of these
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J cities:
wj
wj+1
=
(
Rj
Rj+1
)1−α
.
Therefore, housing price sequence {Rj}Jj=1 is also increasing in j, i.e., more productive
cities have higher housing prices. The following Lemma 3 is the multiple-city version of
Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. (Occupational Choice) In any stable equilibrium with strict ranking of
cities, the productivity cutoff for being a team leader is the same across all cities. That
is, ϕ∗j = ϕ∗j+1 = ϕ∗, for j = 1, 2, ..., J − 1.
The intuition behind this result is the same as in the two-city case. A city with a
higher wj has a proportionally higher pij (ϕ) , due to the Dixit-Stiglitz demand of skill-
intensive components and CRS at the level of producing each variety. The cutoff ϕ∗,
which equates wj and pij (ϕ), does not depend on j.
Lemma 4. A team leader with productivity ϕ can always get higher income by locating
to the more productive city. That is, for all ϕ, pij+1 (ϕ) > pij (ϕ), for j = 1, 2, ..., J − 1.
This means that given her productivity ϕ, a team leader can get the highest income
if she locates in the Jth city. In equilibrium, however, not all team leaders locate
there, because the Jth city also has the highest housing price. Therefore, there exists
a sequence,
{
ϕ∗∗j
}J−1
j=1
such that ϕ∗∗j > ϕ∗ ∀j = 1, 2, ..., J − 1 and team leaders with
ϕ∗∗j are indifferent between residing in jth and (j + 1)th city. The cutoff
{
ϕ∗∗j
}J−1
j=1
is
defined as
pij
(
ϕ∗∗j
)
R1−αj
=
pij+1
(
ϕ∗∗j
)
R1−αj+1
, j = 1, 2, ..., J − 1.
Proposition 3. In any stable equilibrium with strict ranking of cities, the hetereoge-
neous individuals are partitioned into J + 1 intervals. Individuals with ϕ < ϕ∗ become
workers and reside in every city. All individuals with ϕ > ϕ∗ become team leaders. (1)
Team leaders with ϕ such that ϕ∗ < ϕ < ϕ∗∗1 reside in the 1st city. (2) Team leaders
with ϕ such that ϕ∗∗j < ϕ < ϕ∗∗j+1 reside in the (j + 1)th city. (3) And team leaders with
ϕ such that ϕ > ϕ∗∗J reside in the Jth city.
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1.5 Two Extensions
I extend the two-city model to analyze two types of local policies. The first extension
of the model is to incorporate land use regulations. In particular, the assumption that
the supply of housing is fixed at 1 is relaxed. This constraint of housing supply limits
the ability of less skilled team leaders to access the high productivity available in City 2
because of the high housing price. The effect of stringent land use regulations on local
housing prices is well documented in the literature (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks, 2005,
2006; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Saiz, 2010). The inelasticity of housing supply not
only is responsible for the higher housing price in City 2, but also affects how City 2
responds to increases in productivity. Positive perturbations on productivity in City 2
(which result in Φ1 < Φ2), have little impact on the expansion of new construction or
the urban population. The fact that land regulations limit the growth of cities has been
studied extensively in the literature (Hsieh and Moretti, 2014; Glaeser and Gottlieb,
2008).
The second extension of the model is to introduce local financial incentives. To
reduce spatial disparities, local governments offer financial incentives to attract firms
to less productive areas. Kline and Moretti (2013) report that an estimated 95 billion
dollars are spent annually in the United States to attract firms to certain locations.
Incentives come in many forms: cash grants and loans, sales tax breaks, income tax
credits and exemptions, free services, and property tax abatements (Story, 2012). All of
these aim at attracting the most productive firms, and thus the highly skilled workers
to particular regions. These local financial incentives are widespread and have been
studied in the literature (Busso, Gregory, and Kline, 2013; Mayer, Mayneris, and Py,
2012; Gaubert, 2014). This section will analyze the equilibrium effects of a local subsidy
to City 1, the less productive city. It turns out that the policy has positive impact on
the growth of the targeted city.
1.5.1 Land Regulations
In this section, I study the effects of land-use regulations. Following Saks (2008) and
Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005), recent work argues that housing supply has become
very inelastic in some places because of restrictive land-use regulations. Some land-use
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restrictions that are specifically targeted at multiunit dwellings can have national impli-
cations. A reasonable case that the extraordinary post-1990 growth of Atlanta, Dallas,
Houston, and Phoenix, and the far more limited expansion of the regions around New
York, Boston, and San Francisco, owes much to the differences in land-use regulations
between these two sets of places (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008).
Model with a Housing Construction Sector
I start with the asymmetric equilibrium in the baseline model with two cities. Each city
is still endowed with 1 unit of land, but I introduce a housing construction sector in
City 1, the less productive city. Instead of letting competitive landowners convert each
unit of land to one unit of housing, landowners construct housing hj by combining their
land θj with local labor lH,j , according to the housing production function
hj = θ
bj
j
(
lH,j
1− bj
)1−bj
.
The land-use intensity parameter bj restricts the amount of housing that can be built
with a given amount of land. The lower the b, the more elastic the housing supply,
given a fixed amount of land. Housing supply is perfectly inelastic when bj = 1, which
corresponds to the case in the baseline model. In the policy experiment, I analyze the
case in which b2 = 1 and how lowering b1 impacts the economy.
The housing market in each city is competitive, and landowners take both the hous-
ing price Rj and the wage rate wj as given. Since each city has 1 unit of land, the
housing supply in each city can be written as
hSj =
(
Rj
wj
) 1−bj
bj
.
Each individual consumes final goods and housing to maximize her utility (1.2.13). The
demand for housing in each city is
hDj =
(1− α)Yj
Rj
,
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where Yj is city j’s income.7 The housing market clearing condition in each city pins
down the housing price. By introducing the housing construction sector, there are
now three sources of labor demand, the demand from the production of labor-intensive
components, the demand from each team leader, and the demand from landowners to
build housing. Appendix A details the equilibrium housing prices and labor hired in
the housing markets, as well as the computation of wages and income.
Policy Experiment
I model the relaxation of land-use regulations by decreasing the parameter b1, which
increases the elasticity of housing supply in City 1, the less productive city. I compare
the sorting outcome and industrial specialization of two economies: one with b1 = b2 = 1
(perfectly inelastic housing supply in both cities as in the baseline model) and the other
one with b1 = 0.5 and b2 = 1 (more elastic housing supply in City 1).
The results can be seen in Figures 1.4 and 1.5. The equilibrium outcomes of the
occupational choice and sorting behavior are illustrated in Figure 1.4. The productivity
cutoff ϕ∗ increases as a result of decreasing b1. This is due to the extra demand for
workers by the housing construction sector, which raises the wage rate for workers.
Some least skilled team leaders now find that being a worker is more attractive. The
effect of lowering b1 on the second productivity cutoff, ϕ∗∗ is also positive. By making
City 1 a more attractive place to live, some team leaders in City 2, now would like
to move to City 1. These team leaders are the least skilled ones in City 2, but upon
migrating to City 1, they become the most skilled in City 1. As a result, City 1 becomes
more productive and larger because of the influx of skilled team leaders, while City 2
becomes less productive and smaller due to the leaving of team leaders.8
Figure 1.5 depicts the comparative advantage and pattern of specialization when
b1 is lowered. City 1 indeed becomes larger and more final goods sectors locate there.
City 2 ends up having a smaller mass of final goods sectors, which produce the most
skill-intensive goods. The equilibrium effects of the policy that increases the housing
supply promote the growth of the city. City 1 will become larger as its housing supply
7Here I maintain the assumption of absentee landowners, i.e., the rents received by landowners are
not included in Yj .
8I define productivity at city level as aggregate productivity (in equation 1.2.8). One should note
that the average productivity in both cities is higher as a result of an increase in ϕ∗∗.
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Figure 1.4: Individual Behavior with Increased Housing Supply in City 1
(a) Occupational Choice
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Figure 1.5: Pattern of Specialization with Increased Housing Supply in City 1
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becomes more and more elastic. Least skilled goods previously produced in City 2 will
be produced in City 1 and exported to City 2.
1.5.2 Local Financial Incentives
In this section, I examine the effects of a subsidy to team leader’s income in City 1,
as an analogue to subsidies or tax breaks offered to productive firms. This type of
policies is widespread in the U.S. For example, Shell has been offered a tax credit worth
as much as $1.6 billion over 25 years from Pennsylvania, which competed with West
Virginia and Ohio for an energy production facility; Caterpillar announced a new plant
in Georgia, which offered $44 million in incentives; San Francisco exempted Twitter
from $22 million in payroll taxes.
Model with a Local Subsidy
Formally, I start with my baseline model with two cities and introduce a local govern-
ment in City 1, who fully tax local landowners and subsidize local team leaders. This is
aimed at attracting more team leaders moving to City 1 to increase local productivity.
The rate at which team leaders is subsidized, T1, does not depend on team leader’s
individual productivity ϕ, since the government has little information over individual
team leaders. Instead of (1.2.10), each team leader i who locates in City 1 gets
pi1 (i) = (1 + T1)
ε
1 + ε
(
ϕ(i)
Φ1
) 1
ε
Y Γ1.
The government finances the subsidy from the profits made on the housing market. The
aggregate income of landowners in City 1 is
piH = R1h− w1lH = (1− α)Y1.
And the government balanced budget condition gives
(1− α)Y1 = L
ˆ ϕ∗∗
ϕ∗
T1
1 + T1
pi1 (ϕ) dF (ϕ) ,
which can be solved to obtain the equilibrium subsidy T ∗1 . Appendix A provides the
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details of solving this equilibrium.
Policy Experiment
I model the implementation of this type of place-based policies by incorporating the
subsidy T ∗1 in City 1, while keeping City 2 unchanged from the baseline model, i.e., no
subsidy in City 2. The equilibrium effects of such a policy are shown in Figures 1.6 and
1.7, in which I compare the results with those in the baseline model.
Figure 1.6(a) gives the change in the occupational choice as a result of the subsidy.
The productivity cutoff for being a team leader, ϕ∗, decreases, as the subsidy in City
1 raises pi1 so that some workers now find it better off to be team leaders in City 1.
Figure 1.6(b) depicts the change in the location choice. In fact, ϕ∗∗ increases from 3.58
to 13.59. This is because the effect of the subsidy is large enough to induce a large
number of team leaders to move from City 2 to City 1. The result is that City 1 is
now larger, more productive, and has more skilled team leaders (more skill-intensive
varieties of components).
The impact of the subsidy in City 1 is strong enough to reverse the equilibrium
positions of the two cities, as illustrated by Figure 1.7. City 1 now has comparative
advantage of higher-indexed goods, while City 2 has comparative advantage of lower-
indexed goods. In this equilibrium with the subsidy, City 1 produces and exports
skill-intensive goods in (S′, 1], and City 2 produces and exports labor-intensive goods
in [0, S′). The large number of team leaders in City 1 increases local productivity, and
City 1 surpasses City 2 and becomes the larger, more productive city in this economy.
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Figure 1.6: Individual Behavior with a Subsidy in City 1
(a) Occupational Choice
(b) Spatial Sorting
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Figure 1.7: Pattern of Specialization with a Subsidy in City 1
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1.6 Empirical Results
In this section, I empirically examine my predictions relating cities’ housing prices to
their sectoral distribution and skill distribution of workers. First, I study the pattern of
industrial specialization across cities with different housing prices. To do this, I estimate
the effect of housing prices on employment shares for each industry. Then I construct
a skill-intensity index for each city and test whether expensive cities specialize in more
skill-intensive industries. Second, I examine whether it is true that more highly skilled
workers live in places where housing prices are high, as predicted in my model. Finally,
I look at the effects of the two types of policies on the change in housing prices, income,
and populations.
Data are broadly consistent with my model’s predictions. More skill-intensive sectors
locate in places with high housing prices. Skilled workers are more skilled in cities where
housing prices are high. Moreover, both types of policies have positive local effects on
the growth of cities.
1.6.1 The Spatial Distribution of Industries
This section examines the spatial pattern of economic activities. In my theory, more
productive cities have higher housing prices and have comparative advantage in more
skill-intensive goods. I now examine whether cities with high housing prices specialize
in skill-intensive sectors.
Housing Prices and Sectoral Employment Shares
I define a city as a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Metropolitan area boundaries
are based on their 2003 definitions, as issued by the Office of Management and Budget.
Housing price data are taken from Carrillo, Early, and Olsen (2014).9 Employment
data are taken from the 2010 County Business Patterns published by the U.S. Census
Bureau, which contains data for 6-digit NAICS industries across 348 MSAs. I focus on
all three-digit manufacturing sectors. There are 21 such industries. For each industry,
I calculate its employment share in each of these 348 metro areas. To test whether
9See Appendix A for details on data.
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cities with high housing prices specialize in sectors that are skill intensive, I run a cross-
section regression. For each industry, I regress the employment share on housing prices
across cities. The coefficient from each regression gives the effect of a change in housing
price on the change in employment share. A positive coefficient means that there is a
larger share of that industry in cities with higher housing prices. In contrast, a negative
coefficient indicates that the share of that industry is smaller in expensive cities.
The regression results are shown in Table A.1 in Appendix A. Figure 1.8 gives a
visualization of the regression analysis. It plots the 21 industries’ estimated coefficients
against their skill intensities, measured as the percent of college graduates in each in-
dustry.10 There is a clear positive relationship.11 More skill-intensive sectors have
coefficients that are larger and positive, while less skill-intensive sectors have smaller
and negative coefficients. In particular, computer and electronic products manufactur-
ing has 41.14% of workers with a bachelor’s degree and a 1% rise in housing price is
associated with 2.8% rise in its employment share. On the other side, only 9.89% of
employees in the textile mills sector are college graduates, and a 1% increase in housing
price is associated with 4.46% decrease in its employment share. The pattern of spe-
cialization is clear here: cities with high housing prices specialize more in skill-intensive
sectors than they do in less skill-intensive sectors. This is exactly what my model gen-
erates. In any stable equilibrium, cities organize themselves into specializing different
sets of goods. The city which specializes in tradable goods that rely more heavily on
skill-intensive components has a higher housing price in equilibrium.
The empirical literature on classifying cities based on their degrees of specialization
is limited. Black and Henderson (2003) look at all two-digit SIC industries in 1992 and
group cities into different clusters on the basis of similarities of production patterns,
indicated by employment shares of different industries. They also look at the average
size and percent of college graduates in each group. Another related paper is Davis and
Dingel (2013). They calculate the elasticity of occupational and sectoral employment
with respect to city sizes and find that skill-intensive industries have higher elasticities.
10See Appendix A for data sources and detailed description on how to calculate the skill composition
in each industry.
11The only outlier is petroleum and coal product manufacturing, which depends heavily on natural
resources in the particular region.
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Figure 1.8: Industries’ Skill Intensities and Housing Price Effects
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Housing Prices and City-Specific Skill Intensities
The unit of analysis in the previous section is an industry. It only gives us information
on the employment share of each industry across cities, not the industrial composition
of each city. To correct for this, for each city I construct a skill-intensity index, SI, as
follows,
SIi =
∑
j
%collegej × sij .
The skill-intensity index in city i is the sum of the percent of college graduates in each
industry j times the employment share of industry j in city i, sij .12 In other words,
it is the weighted average of skill intensities across all industries in a city. I keep the
index between 0 and 1. Thus, if a city has a skill-intensity index of 0.3, that means the
average percent of college graduates working in manufacturing industries in this city
is 30%. Here I study yearly data between 2003 and 2006, in order to adjust for city
fixed effects.13 Again I look at 21 three-digit manufacturing sectors in 348 Metropolitan
12The data on individuals’ education and industries in which they are employed come from the
American Community Survey made available by IPUMS-USA. See Appendix A for details on data.
13There are two reasons for selecting this time period. First, in 2003, the Office of Management
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Figure 1.9: City-Specific Skill Intensities and Housing Prices, 2006
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Statistical Areas. Figure 1.9 gives a simple cross-city plot of the skill-intensity index
against housing price for the single year 2006, indicating a positive correlation between
these two. Cities that have high housing prices have higher skill-intensity indices. These
cities are skill abundant and specialize in skill-intensive sectors.
The regression results are reported in Table 1.2. The relationship between skill
intensity and housing price is the main focus of this paper. Nonetheless, I also add
population and per capita income as explanatory variables in the regression. The im-
portance of population in theories of cities is vastly emphasized in the urban economics
literature. Population has been used to analyze agglomeration economies in cities. It
is a well known fact that larger cities (in terms of population) typically have a greater
share of college graduates. Davis and Dingel (2013) find empirical evidence that larger
cities specialize in skill-intensive sectors. Here I test if population affects the city-specific
skill intensity. Per capita income is also included in the regression model. I expect cities
and Budget (OMB) revised the definitions and codes of Metropolitan Statistical Areas. For example,
some previous separate metro areas were combined to form a single metro area. More importantly, the
codes that identify these metro areas were changed. Therefore, it is hard to consolidate and study the
cross-city data before 2003 with data after 2003. Second, the housing bubble burst in the U.S. during
the financial crisis in 2008. It is then unwise to study housing data on or after 2008.
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with high income have relatively more skilled workers and thus have higher skill-intensity
indices.
Table 1.2: Housing Prices and Skill Intensities in U.S. Cities
Log skill-intensity index
(1) (2) (3)
Housing price 1.244∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗ 0.132
(0.140) (0.173) (0.416)
Population 0.643 0.692
(0.358) (0.357)
Per capita income 0.689∗
(0.282)
City fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1392 1392 1392
Number of cities 348 348 348
Number of years 4 4 4
R-squared 0.695 0.696 0.699
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The effect of housing price on the skill-intensity index is very strong. Column (1)
indicates that cities with 1% higher housing prices have, on average, 1.24% higher
skill intensities. Even controlled for population, a 1% rise in housing price index leads
to a 1.06% increase in skill-intensity index. The variable population is, however, not
statistically significant in explaining the variation of skill intensities between cities,
as shown in Column (2). The last regression with income is not informative, as the
hypothesis that all regressors equal zero cannot be rejected.
There is a small literature on cross-city distribution of sectoral activities, but the
results obtained from Table 1.2 are consistent with the literature. Holmes and Stevens
(2004) survey the spatial distribution of economic activities in North America. They
show that agriculture, mining, and manufacturing are disproportionately in smaller
cities and finance, insurance, real estate, professional, and management activities are
disproportionately in larger cities. While this paper does not focus on the effect of
population size on spatial activities, the equilibrium outcome of the model indicates
that cities that specialize in skill-intensive sectors are indeed larger.
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1.6.2 The Spatial Distribution of Skills
While there is evidence that a meaningful share of spatial distribution of skills is at-
tributable to spatial sorting of heterogeneous workers (Davis and Dingel, 2012; Eeck-
hout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny, 2014), this sorting is incomplete and individuals of
many skill types are present in every city. My model yields this imperfect sorting, since
there is sorting amongst team leaders but workers locate in both cities and are equally
productive. Therefore, the model only predicts the upper tail of the skill distribution,
not the lower tail. The main empirical finding in this section is that the distribution of
skills in expensive cities has fat upper tail. In other words, cities that have high housing
prices attract more highly skilled individuals. This is exactly what the theory predicts:
the most skilled team leaders sort into cities with high housing prices and less skilled
team leaders are better off in cities with lower housing prices.
The source of data is the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the year 2010. To
test the upper-tail distribution of skills across cities, I restrict my sample to only include
relatively skilled people, i.e., those with at least some college education. I group them
by their educational attainment: some college (including associate degrees), bachelor’s
degrees, and master’s and higher degrees. This educational classification has been used
as a direct measure of skills before (recent examples include Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and
Schmidheiny, 2014; Davis and Dingel, 2012). Figure 1.10 visualizes the fraction of skilled
workers in these three educational groups in cities with high and low housing prices. It
shows that cities with housing prices in the first quartile have more workers with some
college education, but less workers with bachelor’s or higher degrees, compared to cities
with housing prices in the fourth quartile. Namely, skilled workers are more skilled in
cities with high housing prices, thus confirming the theoretical prediction that more
skilled team leaders sort into cities where housing prices are high.
1.6.3 Effects of Policies on Housing Prices, Wages, and Populations
This section examines the effects of the two types of policies, as described in Section
1.5. To do this, I conduct the following regression analysis:
yi = β0 + β1ln(xi) + β2zi + β3ln(xi)zi + i.
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Figure 1.10: Skilled Are More Skilled in Expensive Cities
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Here, yi, which can be the housing price index, (log) income per capita, (log) population
for each city i, is regressed on metropolitan-level characteristics that capture the two
types of policies. The first predictor is xi, the fraction of highly skilled among the group
of skilled workers, measured by the ratio of those with bachelor’s or higher degrees to
all those who have at least some college education. Recent research documents that a
larger amount of human capital in a city increases productivity (Glaeser and Saiz, 2004;
Moretti, 2004a,b). This predictor reflects the policies that attract highly skilled workers
to specific regions. These place-based policies will lead to an increase in x.
The extended model in Section 1.5.1 predicts that a more elastic housing supply in
City 2 will have positive local effects on income and population, compared to the baseline
model. Therefore, one key empirical test is to estimate the effect of land regulations. To
do this, I include the second predictor, a dummy variable zi, for highly regulated land
markets. Data for this variable are taken from Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008).
They quantify the land-use regulations by creating the Wharton Residential Land Use
Regulation Index. The index is scaled to have a mean of zero, a standard deviation of
43
one, and is increasing in the amount of regulation.14 Instead of treating regulation as
a continuous variable, I use a dichotomous division of the Wharton Index (zi = 1 for
highly regulated cities). I define metropolitan areas with a value of the index greater
than 0.34 to be locations with high regulations, which comprise the highest third of the
cities in my sample. This is because 89 out of the 293 metro areas clustered around the
mean.
Table 1.3: Effects of Policies on Housing Prices, Income, and Populations, 2010
Housing price index ln(Income/capita) ln(Population)
Fraction of skilled 0.221∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 1.267∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.051) (0.346)
High regulation 0.358∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ -0.125
(0.118) (0.074) (0.506)
Fraction of skilled × high regulation 0.090 0.275∗∗ -0.254
(0.143) (0.089) (0.610)
Observations 203 194 201
R-squared 0.334 0.355 0.284
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The results can be seen in Table 1.3. The coefficients in the second row capture
the impacts of land regulations. More severe regulatory environment is associated with
higher housing prices and income, but not the expansion of city size. The coefficient
of 0.358 indicates that highly regulated cities have higher housing prices. This effect
is equivalent to about three-quarter of a standard deviation of the housing price index,
which is quite large. Highly regulated cities also have 0.272% higher per capita income.
Finally, more severe land regulation is not associated with greater size of cities. The
point estimate is negative, but it is not statistically significant. In sum, as predicted
in the model, an inelastic housing supply makes the city affordable to only the most
skilled people, thus increases average income and restricts the city becoming too large.
The coefficients in the first row reflect the impacts of the local financial incentives
in the typical low-regulation metropolitan area, while those in the third row report the
differential effects of these policies in an area with a highly regulated housing supply. A
14While the mean of the full sample is zero, the mean of metro areas is 0.14, reflecting higher land
regulations in metro areas. There are 293 MSAs included in their sample.
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larger fraction of highly skilled workers is associated with higher housing prices, income,
and populations. This measure of place-based policies strongly predicts growth in low-
regulation metropolitan areas. The extension in Section 1.5.2 builds on the baseline
model, hence the coefficients in the third row, the impacts of the interaction between this
variable and the degree of housing supply regulation, should be considered as well. The
results indicate that more inelastically supplied housing markets have higher per capita
income, but there is no differential impact found for housing prices and populations.
These results are consistent with what the model predicts: local financial incentives
attract more skilled workers to locate there, thus lead to a boom in the housing price,
income, and population in the targeted area.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a theory of cities in which all cross-city heterogeneity is endogenous.
A difference in productivity leads to a difference in worker’s wage rates across cities.
In equilibrium, the housing price in the more productive city is higher, due to the
utility equalization of workers. This higher housing price induces sorting: only the most
talented team leaders will locate there. Less skilled team leaders are better off in the less
productive city. This sorting supports the equilibrium outcomes of the heterogeneity
between cities. Cities with higher housing prices exhibit higher wages, productivity,
aggregate income, populations, and skill intensities - all prominent features in the data.
Extended to incorporating land regulations and local financial incentives, the model
provides a foundation to study the equilibrium effects of these policies in a two-city
scenario. Both types of policies lead to an increase in the productivity, income, and
population in the targeted area.
A distinguishing feature of the model is that it explains spatially heterogeneous
outcomes as emergent results of the sorting process, without relying on assumptions
of asymmetries in individual’s ability to move or cities’ fundamental characteristics.
Yet it yields a rich set of spatial patterns. I find empirical evidence from U.S. data
for the pattern of industrial specialization and skill distribution. Analyzing at both
industry and city level, I find that cities with higher housing prices specialize in more
skill-intensive sectors. The skill level in the top percentiles of these cities is higher.
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Given the theory, this provides empirical support for the spatial sorting of individuals
and comparative advantage of cities: the comparative advantage in tradable sectors
that depend more on skill-intensive components makes more skilled team leaders, who
produce these components, locate there. In addition, the empirical results provide
insights into the effects of policies on the targeted places. Using the Wharton Index as
an approximation of the severity of housing regulation, I find that higher land regulations
in cities can lead to a boom in housing prices and income. This supports the theory
that if the housing supply is fixed, only the most skilled team leaders locate there,
reinforcing the high housing price and income in the city. I also measure the skill level
in the top percentiles of the skill distribution across cities by calculating the ratio of
people with at least a bachelor’s degree relative to those with some college education.
The regression analysis provides empirical support for the model. More skilled workers
in a city increase the local housing price, income, and population, thus the policies that
attract highly skilled workers encourage the growth of cities.
Chapter 2
A Spatial Explanation for
Cross-City Price Differences
2.1 Introduction
The variation in prices across cities plays an important role in many urban and New
Economic Geography (NEG) models. The vast majority of literature emphasizes on
the price of tradable goods and land price. Theories typically predict that price indices
over tradable goods are lower in larger cities (see, e.g., Fujita (1988); Krugman (1991);
Helpman (1998); Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2014)). This prediction is at odds with
some empirical work (DuMond, Hirsch, and Macpherson (1999); Tabuchi (2001)), but
it is easy to modify NEG models to generate higher housing prices in larger cities.
However, there are limited studies on the cross-city price differences of non-tradable
goods other than land. This paper provides an empirical analysis to document this fact
and a theoretical explanation for it.
The contribution of this paper is two folds. First, the paper documents the key
observations on price differences. Large cities have higher aggregate price indices. Con-
trary to existing theories, prices of tradable goods are higher in larger cities. Prices
of non-tradable goods (except land or housing) also rise with population. Though all
three price indices increase with population, the price difference is larger in non-tradable
goods but smaller for tradable goods. Second, the paper provides a spatial model that
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explains why relative price of non-tradable goods is higher in cities with higher pop-
ulation. The model features an internal spatial structure of cities: locations within
cities are heterogeneous and more desirable locations are occupied by agents who can
gain more out of it. In equilibrium, all agents choose their optimal location. The model
provides a microeconomic foundation for the stylized facts on cross-city price differences.
More specifically, I use a monocentric city model in which market exchange takes
place at the city center. I study a circular city with a central business district (CBD)
surrounded by a ring of residences. Two goods, tradable manufacturing goods and
nontradable service goods, are produced using land and labor, while people consume
these two types of goods and residential land. Firms incur iceberg transport costs and
the transport costs differ across sectors. Services generally need face-to-face meeting,
hence it is most expensive to deliver service goods. Commuting, on the other hand,
takes the form of a loss of labor time and is the cheapest of all transportation activities.
The need to save on transport costs draws both firms and residents towards the city
center, while the need for land in production and residential housing keeps the city from
collapsing on a point.
In equilibrium, all agents choose their optimal location. Firms, by locating closer to
the city center, save transport costs but face a higher land price and wage rate. Since
service sector has the highest transport cost, it has more to gain from being closest to
the center, followed by the manufacturing sector. Consumers also have a trade-off: by
locating closer to the CBD, commuting cost is lower but land price is higher. Workers are
free to move across sectors so they are indifferent between working at different locations
within CBD. Every consumer-worker at every location receives the same utility, i.e.,
no one can gain by changing her residential or job location. The equilibrium land use
gives three boundaries regarding the internal structure of the city: a boundary between
service and manufacturing sector within CBD, a boundary between CBD and residential
area, and a boundary between urban residential area and rural land use, namely, the
city edge.
The equilibrium analysis is in terms of a closed city: the city’s population is taken
as given and the equilibrium determines the city’s geographic size and the utility it can
deliver to its residents. In particular, I establish the equilibrium relation between city’s
population, the three boundaries, and relative price of service goods. As population
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grows, the city edge increases. This is because residents demand more goods as well
as land, and firms also need more land for production in order to meet the increased
demand. This increase in city edge pulls out both internal boundaries within the city
that divide the land to different use. In particular, as the boundary between service and
manufacturing sector increases, service sector is affected proportionately more, because
service sector has a higher transport cost. Therefore, service goods become relatively
more expensive.
Empirically, I document the facts about the price differences across cities. Using the
detailed component data on 56 individual goods and services collected in 209 U.S. cities
in 2010, I construct price indices for tradable and nontradable goods for each city. I find
that aggregate city-level Consumer Price Index, tradable and non-tradable price indices
all increase with population. In particular, a one log-unit rise in city size is associated
with a 3.4% increase in non-tradable price index but only a 1.2% increase in tradable
price index. This is consistent with other empirical studies. Cecchetti, Mark, and
Sonora (2002) study the aggregate price levels among cities. They find significant price
differences across cities and very slow convergence. Parsley and Wei (1996) and Engel
and Rogers (1997) both examine violations of the law of one price within the United
States using consumer price data. In particular, Parsley and Wei (1996) examine prices
for different categories of goods. They classify goods into tradables and non-tradables,
and within the tradable category they make a further distinction between perishable
goods (mostly vegetables and dairy products) and nonperishable goods. They find that
services have the highest average price differential.
A distinguishing aspect of the model is that it features an explicit internal struc-
ture of cities to demonstrate the relation between city’s population and prices, which
has not been studied before. The most closely related paper is Karadi and Koren
(2008), who develop a spatial model to explain why price level is higher in rich coun-
tries. My paper is different in two main aspects. First, their model is used to explain
the Balassa-Samuelson effect between countries, while my model explains the cross-city
price differences within a country. Second, their paper’s spatial structure takes a dif-
ferent form. They model each country as an interval on the real line. Furthermore,
residents are assumed to live in the center and business locates father away from the
center. In contrast, I describe a circular city in a monocentric city model, whereby a
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central business district is surrounded by a ring of residences, as developed in classic
work by Alonso, Mills, and Muth in the late 1960s. Another closely related paper is
Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2013), which builds on Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002).
Their paper focuses on the role of externalities on land price in cities with different
supply restrictions.
The paper is related to several strands of the literature. The model builds on and
expands the large theoretical literature on monocentric city model (See Fujita (1989);
Fujita and Thisse (2013); Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999); and Anas, Arnott, and
Small (1998) for a review). It extends traditional models in that it has a spatial division
within the central business district (CBD), i.e., the service production zone and the
manufacturing production zone. This paper also complements the empirical literature
that studies cross-city price differences. Crucini and Shintani (2008) use similar data as
the current paper to examine the persistence of law of one price deviations for nine U.S.
cities. Atkin and Donaldson (2014) estimate intranational trade costs by using spatial
price index as a proxy. Handbury and Weinstein (2014) use detailed barcode data to
identify sources of bias in spatial price index measurement. In complementary work,
Handbury (2013) uses the same barcode data to calculate variety-adjusted city-specific
price indices for households at different income levels. The barcode data, however, only
cover food items.
In what follows, Section 2.2 presents detailed empirical facts about the cross-city
price differences of both tradable and non-tradable goods. Section 2.3 introduces a
spatial model with an internal structure of cities. Section 2.4 derives the equilibrium
conditions and conducts analysis on why relative price of service goods is higher in larger
cities. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
The data is taken from ACCRA (American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Asso-
ciation) Cost of Living Index published by the Council for Community and Economic
Research. The ACCRA index of U.S. urban prices has been used in important papers
such as Chevalier (1995), Parsley and Wei (1996), Albouy (2009), and Moretti (2013). It
provides comparative data for 318 urban areas. Items on which the Index is based have
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been chosen to reflect the different categories of consumer expenditures. ACCRA data
are weighted according to the Consumer Expenditure Survey by U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The ACCRA Cost of Living Index measures relative price levels for consumer
goods and services in participating areas. The average for all participating places, both
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan, equals 100, and each participant’s index is read as
a percentage of the average for all places. Because each ACCRA report is a separate
comparison of prices at a single point in time, I use the 2010 annual average data to
study the price differences across cities. I define a city as a Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA). Metropolitan area boundaries are based on their 2003 definitions, as issued by
the Office of Management and Budget. Based on this definition of cities, the dataset is
reduced to 209 cities in the U.S.
The main advantage of this dataset is that it contains detailed components data for
56 individual goods and services. The main categories of goods and services in the data
are: grocery items, including meats, dairy products, produce, bakery products, and mis-
cellaneous grocery products such as sugar and soft drinks; housing, measured as monthly
rent for a two-bedroom apartment and monthly payment for mortgage; utilities, includ-
ing total home energy cost and telephone; transportation, such as auto maintenance;
health care, including office visits for doctor or dentist, and medicine such as ibupro-
fen; and miscellaneous goods and services, such as pizza, haircut, movie, etc. I group
these 56 individual goods and services into two types: tradable and non-tradable goods.
Tradable goods include all the grocery items, miscellaneous goods such as toothpaste,
shampoo, medicine, clothing items, sports items, and liquor. Non-tradable goods (ex-
cept land/housing) include utilities, transportation, healthcare services, miscellaneous
goods and services such as prepared food in restaurants, beauty services, repairs and
dry cleaning.
The variation in prices across locations is a central issue to economic geography and
international economics. The correlation of price indices with population, which yields
a common agglomerating force across many New Economic Geography (NEG) models,
is the main focus of this section. Figure 2.1 shows the correlation between aggregate
price index (the composite index) and population. Clearly, price rises with population.
To see if price indices for tradable and non-tradable goods also rise with population, I
construct tradable price index (PT ) and non-tradable price index (PN ) from the ACCRA
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Figure 2.1: Correlation between City-Level CPI and Population, 2010
dataset, using the ACCRA item-level weights.
I regress the log of each price index for each city on the log of the city’s population
and report the results in Table 2.1. As shown in the table, there is a strong positive
association between each of these price indices and population. Although the composite
ACCRA index, which includes land prices, rises the steepest with population, there is a
very similar pattern for both the tradable and non-tradable price indices. A one log-unit
rise in city size is associated with a 3.4% increase in non-tradable price index but only
a 1.2% increase in tradable price index. These coefficients are economically significant
as well. It indicates that a consumer in New York pays 4 percent more for tradable
items but 12 percent more for non-tradable items than a person in Des Moines. The
large price difference between the non-tradable goods needs further investigation into
the theory.
NEG models typically predict that price indices over tradable goods are lower in
larger cities (see, e.g., Fujita (1988); Rivera-Batiz (1988); Krugman (1991); Helpman
(1998); Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002); Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2014)).
This prediction is at odds with the empirical analysis above. Other empirical work
also has demonstrated that prices are higher in larger cities (DuMond, Hirsch, and
Macpherson (1999); Tabuchi (2001)). Helpman (1998) and Suedekum (2006) suggest
that, while the price of purely traded goods should be lower in cities, the inclusion
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Table 2.1: Price Indices and Population, 2010
(1) (2)
log PT log PN
log MSA Population 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗
(0.00361) (0.00747)
Constant 4.445∗∗∗ 4.157∗∗∗
(0.0469) (0.0971)
Observations 209 209
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.35
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
of non-tradable prices in the aggregate price index can produce an inconclusive result.
However, my empirical analysis in this section shows that larger cities do have higher
price, in all three price indices, and the price difference is larger for non-tradable goods
but smaller for tradable goods. Contrary to theories in New Economic Geography
literature, both tradable and non-tradable prices rise with population. This illustrates
the importance of relative price of non-tradables in developing the theory in this paper.
2.3 Model
Space is modeled as a flat and featureless plain, with an arbitrary point marked off as
the center. I study a circular city with radius S in the plain, considering only symmetric
allocations. Therefore, a location is fully described by the location’s distance r from
the city center (0, 0). The city center serves as a marketplace: all goods and services
are exchanged there. Land is owned by agents who play no role in the theory: absentee
landlords.
Production Technology
There are two goods: manufactured goods, which is the numeraire, and services. Both
are costly to transport to the center. Let ni(r) be the employment by industry i
(i = m, s) per unit of land at location r. Production at location r is assumed to be
a constant returns to scale function of land, 2pir, and labor, 2pirni(r), at that location.
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Production in each industry i per unit of land at location r is
Yi(r) = Aini(r)β, β ∈ (0, 1),
where Ai is a TFP term that is common to all firms in industry i in the city. Firms incur
an iceberg transport cost: when one unit of good is shipped r miles, only exp(−τir)
remains.
Let w (r) be the market wage at location r. Let qiF (r) be the maximum rent a firm
would be willing to pay for a unit of land at location r. Firm’s problem implies that
qiF (r) is the maximized profit a firm can get per unit of land,
qiF (r) = piexp(−τir)Aini(r)β − w(r)ni(r)
= max{n}
{
piexp(−τir)Ainβi − w(r)ni
}
.
(2.3.1)
Consumers
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor, which she supplies inelastically to
the joint activity of working and commuting. There is a technology for commuting.
Following Anas, Arnott, and Small (2000) and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), the
commuting cost takes the form of a loss of labor time that depends on the distance
travelled to and from work. Specifically, I assume that a worker who resides in location
r and commute to a firm at location t has exp(−κ|t − r|) unit of time to devote to
production, where κ > 0. Symmetric allocations imply that a worker only commutes
along the straight line that connects her residential location and the city center. There
is no commuting cost for shopping, as shopping can be viewed as a leisure. Consumer’s
preference can be written as
u(m, s, l) = m(r)α1s(r)α2 l(r)α3 ,
where α1, α2, α3 ∈ (0, 1) and α1 + α2 + α3 = 1. Here m (r) , s (r), and l (r) denote the
consumption of manufactured goods, services, and land by each consumer resided at
location r, respectively. Therefore, the problem for a consumer who lives at location r
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and works at t can be written as
w(t)exp(−κ|t− r|) = pmm(r) + pss(r) + qH(r)l(r)
= min{m,s,l} {m+ pss+ qH(r)l}
(2.3.2)
s.t. u(m, s, l) ≥ U¯
where pm (r), ps (r), and qH (r) denote the prices of manufactured goods, services, and
land, while U¯ is the reservation utility: the maximum utility a resident can get by
locating elsewhere in the larger economy.
The Internal Structure of the City
Following the urban economics literature, I assume the city is monocentric with a CBD
of positive radius and a surrounding residential ring. I take the city edge S as given.
Specifically, I introduce an explicit internal structure within the CBD area. The service
sector locates closest to the center, followed by the manufacturing sector. Some re-
strictions of parameters will be imposed to make this internal structure an equilibrium.
Figure 2.2 shows the land-use map of the city. Let S1 be the boundary between service
and manufacturing sector and S2 be the boundary between the manufacturing sector
and residential area.
2.4 Equilibrium
Firms
It is customary in urban economic theory to approach land use in terms of bid rent
functions (Alonso (1964); Fujita (1989)). From the firm’s problem in (2.3.1), the optimal
choice of n conditional on locating at r is given by
n∗i (r) = (βpiexp(−τir)Ai/w(r))1/(1−β) . (2.4.1)
Then,
qiF (r) =
1− β
β
(
βpiexp(−τir)Aiw(r)−β
)1/(1−β)
, (2.4.2)
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Figure 2.2: Land-Use Map of the City
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and qiF (r) is the bid rent function for firms in industry i. The intuition is that a firm
pays a lower rent if it is farther away from the city center.
Consumers
Every consumer at every location must receive the reservation utility U¯ in equilibrium.
Let qH(r) be the residential bid rent function: the maximum rent a worker would be
willing to pay for a unit of land at location r. Solving the consumer’s problem in (2.3.2),
m∗(r) = α1w(t)exp(−κ|t− r|),
s∗(r) = α2w(t)exp(−κ|t− r|)/ps,
l∗(r) = α3w(t)exp(−κ|t− r|)/qH(r),
qH(r) =
(
αα11 α
α2
2 α
α3
3 p
−α2
s w(t)exp(−κ|t− r|)/U¯
)1/α3
,
where m∗ (r), s∗ (r), and l∗ (r) are the optimal choices of consumption at location r.
Intuitively, a resident pays a lower rent if she locates farther away from the center and
if the utility she can get elsewhere is higher. Let N(r) be the number of residents
per unit of land at location r. In other words, N (r) is the household density. Since
each resident occupies l(r) units of land, residential land market clearing condition will
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be N(r)l(r) = 1. Therefore, in equilibrium, N(r) = 1/l∗(r). For an allocation to be
feasible, we need a condition that all residents have to be accommodated somewhere
in the city. This means that the integral of household density over the residential area
must equal the total population, P ,
P =
ˆ S
S2
N(r)2pirdr =
ˆ S
S2
2pir
l∗(r)dr.
In addition, there is an arbitrage condition at the city edge S. Residential rent there
must equal the rent in non-urban use, rA, which is usually called “agricultural rent” in
the literature, and is assumed not to vary with location.
The Internal Structure of the City
The analytical tractability is due to the fact that I can express all endogenous variables
as negative exponentials, i.e., x(r) = x(0)exp(−φxr), where φx depends only on pref-
erence and technology parameters. Since wage rate w (r) only depends on the location
r, let us consider the business zone, with r ∈ [0, S2] , first. Workers are free to move
across sectors. They must be indifferent between working at different locations within
the business zone. Wage can be then expressed as
w(r) = w(0)exp(−κr) r ∈ [0, S2).
Thus wages decline exponentially from the city center, reflecting that no one can gain
by changing her job location. Wages closer to the city center are higher because the
commuting costs are higher. Substituting this into equation (2.4.1) and using equation
(2.4.2) yields the employment density
ni(r) = ni(0)exp
(
−τi − κ1− β r
)
r ∈ [0, S2),
where ni(0) = (βpiAi/w(0))1/(1−β) . The firms’ bid rent function in sector i is
qiF (r) = qiF (0)exp
(
−τi − κβ1− β r
)
r ∈ [0, S2),
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where qiF (0) =
1−β
β
(
βpiAiw(0)−β
)1/(1−β)
. Note that this bid rent function is decreasing
in r provided that τi − κβ > 0.
Given that workers commute to the business zone earn the same regardless of where
they work, it is convenient to imagine the place of work is at city center, r = 0. Then
the maximum rent a worker is willing to pay and still get U¯ is
qH(r) = qH(0)exp
(
− κ
α3
r
)
r ∈ [0, S] ,
where qH(0) =
(
αα11 α
α2
2 α
α3
3 p
−α2
s w(0)/U¯
)1/α3 .
For the internal structure outlined in Figure 2.2 to be an equilibrium outcome, two
conditions are needed at each boundary. At boundary S1, the bid rent of service sector
must be the same as that of manufacturing sector, qsF (S1) = qmF (S1), and the slope
of service sector’s bid rent function must be steeper than the slope of manufacturing
sector’s bid rent function. These two conditions impose a constraint on the parameters
τi. The slope of qiF (r) can be written as qi
′
F (r) = − τi−κβ1−β qiF (r). The conditions that
qsF (S1) = qmF (S1) and qs
′
F (S1) > qm
′
F (S1) imply that τs > τm, which means that the
service sector has a higher transport cost than the manufacturing sector. This ensures
that service sector locates closest to the center, followed by the manufacturing sector.
This is intuitive as services generally need face-to-face meeting, thus services involve
travelling of people rather than shipping of goods. Hence this sector has more to gain
from being closest to the center. Similarly, at boundary S2, bid rent of manufacturing
sector must be the same as the bid rent of residents, and the slope of the former must
be steeper than that of the latter. The slope of qH (r) is q′H(r) = − κα3 qH(S2). The
conditions that qmF (S2) = qH(S2) and qm
′
F (S2) > q′H (S2) imply that κ < τmα31−β+α3β . Since
α3, β < 1, α31−β+α3β < 1. In addition, firms’ rent bid functions are downward sloping.
Therefore, for the spatial structure of the city to be an equilibrium, the restriction on
parameters is
κβ < τm < τs.
In other words, when a firm decides its location, it faces a trade-off: by locating one unit
closer to the city center, it saves shipping cost (captured by τi) but it also has to pay a
higher wage for workers to commute longer (captured by κβ). The savings on shipping
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cost must outweigh the extra cost on wages paid for firms to locate in the area that
is closer to the center. This ensures that firms would locate in the CBD and residents
would locate farther away.
Equilibrium
Definition 1. An equilibrium in this economy is a collection of continuous functions
{ni(r), N(r), w(r), qiF (r), qH(r)}, for i = {s,m}, together with prices {pm, ps} such that
for all r,
1. wage arbitrage condition: w(r) = w(0)exp(−κr) r ∈ [0, S2),
2. ni(r) and qiF (r) are the employment density and bid rent functions defined by the
firm’s problem,
3. N(r) and qH(r) are the residential density and bid rent function defined by the
consumer’s problem,
4. qiF (r) and qH(r) satisfy equilibrium land rents condition: i.e., each piece of land
goes to the highest-bidding use,
5. feasibility constraint: P =
´ S
S2
N(r)2pirdr,
6. labor market clears at boundary S2,
7. goods market clears at the center.
It is assumed that land is allocated to its highest-value use. Therefore, the equilib-
rium land rent at any location is the maximum of the bid rents there:
q(r) = max [qsF (r), qmF (r), qH(r), rA] =

qsF (0)exp
(
− τs−κβ1−β r
)
r ∈ [0, S1)
qmF (0)exp
(
− τm−κβ1−β r
)
r ∈ [S1, S2)
qH(0)exp
(
− κα3 r
)
r ∈ [S2, S]
rA r ∈ (S,∞).
Figure 2.3 plots the equilibrium land rents for both the business zone - service and
manufacturing sectors - and the residential zone.
The location of the commercial district boundary, S2, is dentermined by the labor
market clearing condition. At boundary S2, each worker living at location r contributes
exp (−κ (r − S2)) units of labor time, taking into account of the time lost in commuting
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Land Rents
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from r to S2. The total supply of labor time at S2 is thus
´ S
S2
N(r)exp (−κ (r − S2)) 2pirdr.
Since the employment density at location t in the business zone is ni(t), labor time
needed at boundary S2 to fulfill this demand is thus exp (κ (S2 − t))ni(t), taking into
account of the time lost in commuting from S2 to t. So the total time needed at S2 to
satisfy total labor demand inside the business zone is
´ S1
0 2pirns(t)exp (κ (S2 − t)) dt +´ S2
S1
2pirnm(t)exp (κ (S2 − t)) dt. Therefore, equating labor demand and labor supply
will give us
´ S
S2
N(r)exp (−κ (r − S2)) 2pirdr =
´ S1
0 2pirns(t)exp (κ (S2 − t)) dt
+
´ S2
S1
2pirnm(t)exp (κ (S2 − t)) dt.
(2.4.3)
Turning to goods market clearing conditions, note that output per unit of land,
taking into account of the shipping cost, can be written as
yi(r) = Aiexp (−τir)ni(r)β.
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Total supply of each type of goods at the city center is
s =
´ S1
0 2pirAsexp (−τsr)ns(r)βdr,
m =
´ S2
S1
2pirAmexp (−τmr)nm(r)βdr.
(2.4.4)
From the consumer’s preference, the ratio of the consumption of the two types of goods
is sm =
α2pm
α1ps
. If one plugs in the expressions for s and m from the above, the relative
prices can be pinned down, which governs the main result of this paper.
Equilibrium Characterization
To determine the equilibrium of the model, I show that the analysis is in terms of a
closed city. That is, the city’s population, P , is taken as given and the equilibrium
determines the city’s geographic size, S, and the utility it can deliver to its residents,
U¯ . Since all functions are negative exponentials, the only unknowns are values of these
functions at r = 0 and will be determined once ni(0) is determined. To see this, note
that wage rate and bid rent functions at location r = 0 can be written as
w(0) = βpiAini(0)β−1,
qiF (0) = (1− β) piAini(0)β = 1−ββ w(0)ni(0),
and recall qmF (S2) = qH(S2), then the residential rent at r = 0 can be expressed as
qH(0) = qmF (0)exp
(
−α3τm − α3κβ − κ+ κβ
α3 (1− β) S2
)
.
Therefore, all of these variables at r = 0 are functions of ni (0).
Using the expressions for qH(r), ni(r), and l(r), the labor market clearing condition
in (2.4.3) can be written as
exp
(
−α3τm−α3κβ−κ+κβα3(1−β) S2
) ´ S
S2
rexp
(
− κα3 r
)
dr
= α3β1−β exp
(
τs−τm
1−β S1
) ´ S1
0 rexp
(
− τs−κβ1−β r
)
dr
+ α3β1−β
´ S2
S1
rexp
(
− τm−κβ1−β r
)
dr.
(2.4.5)
This is one equation that only depends on the boundaries, S, S1, and S2. Plugging in
the goods market clearing conditions in (2.4.4) into the equation of relative prices, we
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get
exp
(
τs − τm
1− β S1
) ´ S1
0 rexp
(
− τs−κβ1−β r
)
dr´ S2
S1
rexp
(
− τm−κβ1−β r
)
dr
= α2
α1
, (2.4.6)
which only depends on boundaries S1 and S2.
Higher Relative Price in Larger Cities
Recall that at boundary S1, qsF (S1) = qmF (S1). Using expressions for qiF (r) and ni(0),
the relative price of services is
(
psAs
pmAm
)1/(1−β)
= exp
(
τs − τm
1− β S1
)
. (2.4.7)
Since τs > τm, as long as As/Am is constant, the relative price of services is increasing
in S1. Intuitively, it is equally profitable to produce services and manufactured goods
at the boundary S1. The farther out the boundary, the higher the transport cost, which
affects the service sector disproportionately more. And this has to be compensated by
the higher price of services. The main result of the paper is to show how a change in
population, P , affects the boundary S1.
The following analysis takes several steps as outlined below. First, I will prove
that if the boundary between manufacturing sector and residential area, S2, is taken
as given, then S1, the boundary between service and manufacturing sector, is strictly
increasing in S2. Also, if both population, P , and city edge, S, are taken as given, then
S2 is strictly increasing in S. Second, I show that given productivity Ai, the city size,
S (Ai, P ), is strictly increasing in population, P . To see this, I first demonstrate that
given Ai and S, the employment density at the city center, ni(0), and bid rent functions,
qmF (r), qH(r), are increasing in P . In addition, given Ai and P , these three functions,
ni(0), qmF (r), and qH(r), are decreasing in S. Finally, I show that qH(S;Ai, P ) is strictly
decreasing in S and increasing in P .
Lemma 1. For each S2 > 0, (2.4.6) uniquely determines S1(S2) ∈ (0, S2) . Furthermore,
S1(S2) is strictly increasing in S2.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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The intuition is that equation (2.4.6) implicitly defines S1 as a function of S2, i.e.,
there is a unique S1 corresponding to each S2 and it is strictly increasing in S2. In other
words, if the boundary between manufacturing sector and residential area is farther
away from the city center, then the boundary between service and manufacturing sector
must also increase. To see the relation between S2 and S, rearraNging (2.4.6) and
plugging into (2.4.5) can further simplify (2.4.5) to
exp
(
−α3τm−α3κβ−κ+κβα3(1−β) S2
) ´ S
S2
rexp
(
− κα3 r
)
dr
= α3β1−β
(
1 + α1α2
)
exp
(
τs−τm
1−β S1(S2)
) ´ S1(S2)
0 rexp
(
− τs−κβ1−β r
)
dr.
(2.4.8)
Lemma 2. For each S > 0, the expression above uniquely determines S2(S) ∈ (0, S) .
Furthermore, S2(S) is strictly increasing in S.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As city edge moves outwards, so does the boundary between the business zone and
residential area. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 together give the relation between the three
boundaries of the city, which will be useful in the proof of the main result later. The next
part is to show the relation between population and the boundaries. From the feasibility
constraint, P =
´ S
S2
N(r)2pirdr, expressions for l(r), qH(0), and equation (2.4.8), the
employment density ni (0) can be written as
nm(0) =
P
2pi
(
1 + α1α2
) ´ SS2 rexp
(
− κα3 r
)
dr
exp
(
τs−τm
1−β S1
) ´ S1
0 rexp
(
− τs−κβ1−β r
)
dr
´ S
S2
rexp
(
−κ(1−α3)α3 r
)
dr
,
(2.4.9)
ns(0) = exp
(
τs − τm
1− β S1
)
nm(0). (2.4.10)
If Ai and S are held constant, a change in P will change ni (0) proportionally. Recall
that the equilibrium of the model is determined by ni (0). Therefore, the following
proposition summarizes the effects of a change in population:
Proposition 1. If Ai and S are held constant, (i) employment density ni(0) change
proportionately with P, (ii) elasticity of rents qmF (r) and qH(r) in any location with
respect to P is β, (iii) elasticity of wage in any location with respect to P is β − 1.
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Turning to the effects of a change in the land supply, let Ai and P be constant. Then
from (2.4.9) and (2.4.10) it implies that nm (0) is decreasing in S. This can be obtained
by using Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and also Lemma 2 from Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2013),
which states an important algebraic result. Similarly, ns (0) is also decreasing in S. The
intuition is that the employment density at the city center is lower in a more spread-out
city. Therefore, it follows that:
Proposition 2. If Ai and P are held constant, the employment density ni(0) and rents
qmF (0), qH(0) are decreasing in S.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 implies that as the city’s geographic size increases, the rent at the
city center decreases. Now the effects of a change in population, P , and the effects of a
change in land supply, S, are established. It remains to show the effects of a change in
population on the city size, S, namely, the determination of S and U¯ , given Ai and P .
Since the agricultural rent outside the city is rA, the city edge, S, is determined by
qH (S;Am, P ) = rA,
where qH (S;Am, P ) is the rent at the city edge when the TFP in the manufacturing
sector is Am and the population is P . The following Lemma gives the relation between
qH (S;Am, P ) and S.
Lemma 3. qH (S;Am, P ) is strictly decreasing in S and strictly increasing in Am and
P .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Holding other variables constant, rent at the city edge falls with the city size, S,
because people living at the boundary earn the least due to the large amount of time
lost in commuting to work. Given Lemma 3, for any Ai, P , and rA, there is a unique S,
that solves qH (S;Am, P ) = rA. Let the solution be S (Am, P ). Then immediately from
Lemma 3:
Proposition 3. S (Am, P ) is strictly increasing in P.
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Therefore, the main result of this paper is established: larger cities have higher
relative prices. The logic can be seen as follows: by Proposition 3, cities with higher
population have a larger city size. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, as the city is more
spread-out, so does the boundary between service and manufacturing sector (S1). By
equation (2.4.7), as long as As/Am is constant, the relative price of services is increasing
in S1. This explains why cities with higher population have higher relative price.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper has two important contributions. First, it documents the empirical facts
about price differences of tradable and non-tradable goods across cities. Previous studies
have largely focused on aggregate price index and housing or land prices. While theories
in NEG predict that price of tradable goods is lower in larger cities, recent empirical
evidence by Handbury and Weinstein (2014) only contains data of food items. This
paper uses detailed component data for 56 individual goods and services across 209
U.S. cities to construct price indices for both tradable and non-tradable goods and
services. I find that contrary to existing theories, price of tradable goods is higher in
larger cities. Price of non-tradable goods, excluding land, is also significantly higher
in larger cities. In particular, a one log-unit rise in city size is associated with a 3.4%
increase in non-tradable price index but only a 1.2% increase in tradable price index.
To address this cross-city price difference, this paper proposes a spatial model of
cities in which an explicit internal structure is introduced: service sector locates clos-
est to the city center, followed by manufacturing sector, and then by residents. The
difference in transport costs ensures this spatial structure. All agents face a trade-off:
by locating closer to the center, they save transport or commuting cost but they have
to pay a higher land price. In equilibrium, all agents choose their optimal location.
The equilibrium defines the boundaries of the city. As population grows, the city edge
increases. This leads to an increase in the boundary between service and manufacturing
sector, which affects service sector proportionately more, because service sector has a
higher transport cost. Therefore, the relative price of services is higher in larger cities.
Chapter 3
Sudden Stops, Financial
Frictions, and the Banking Sector
3.1 Introduction
Last decade has witnessed several episodes in which the interest-rate driven capital
flows affected the economic developments of several emerging market countries. After
the 1994 Mexican devaluation, the Russian default and Asian crises in 1997-1998, Latin
American and Asian countries experienced how the increase of interest rates gave rise to
deep recessions, unemployment, and financial turmoil. These financial crises of the last
decade in emerging economies have typically been accompanied by large falls in total
factor productivity. Recent research shows that the drop in TFP attributed to the GDP
declines in these sudden stop episodes. Investigating the forces behind these movements
in total factor productivity is crucial to understand the real effects of financial crises.
The effects of interest rate shocks that are independent of domestic economic devel-
opments have been studies empirically: assessing the relative importance of internal
and external factors to explain the surge of capital flows to Asian and Latin Ameri-
can countries during the 1990’s, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996) conclude that
the cyclical movement in world interest rates is the most critical element that explains
those capital flows and the subsequent growth stimulus. Theoretical work, however, has
neglected the importance of financial intermediaries in the borrowing-lending process
when a economy is hit by a shock to the world interest rate. In this paper, I explore
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the role of financial frictions with a banking sector in exacerbating inefficiencies and
explaining the drop in measured TFP.
More specifically, I build a small open economy model in which banks are the only
domestic agents with access to international capital markets. Households own all banks
and firms in the economy and their assets are bank loans and physical capital. House-
holds make consumption, investment, and borrowing decisions. There is one tradable
sector, which uses capital, labor and intermediate goods in a constant returns to scale
technology to produce a single final good. The final good is used for consumption, in-
vestment and the production of intermediate goods. The production process is subject
to a working capital constraint that requires firms to hold non-interest-bearing assets to
finance a fraction of the purchase of intermediate goods each period. The representative
bank borrows from international capital markets and lends to domestic households and
firms. The bank is subject to a reserve requirement and pays and charges interest in
advance. The economy exports and saves in final goods. Besides intertemporal adjust-
ment costs for capital, the financial constraint on the purchase of intermediate goods is
the only friction in the model.
An exogenous increase in the world interest rate has a twofold effect. First, it in-
creases the domestic interest rate through the bank’s intermediation. The bank acts
as an amplification mechanism of interest rate shocks: a one percent increase in world
interest rate is translated to more than one percent increase in domestic interest rate.
Second, as the domestic interest rate rises, it increases the wedge between the producer
cost and the user cost of intermediate goods. Firms, with working capital financing
needs, will experience an increase in the cost of production. This worsens the misallo-
cation and generates an endogenous fall in TFP and output.
The model is calibrated to the Mexican economy prior to the sudden stop of 1994
and subject to the world interest rate shocks observed during the sudden stop. The
model generates a 5.9 percent fall in output, though a larger fall compared to the data.
It delivers a TFP fall by 4.9 percent, accounting for 74 percent of the observed decline
in TFP in the data. The model is also consistent with a current account reversal,
investment, and bank loans to the private sector, as observed in the data.
A distinguishing aspect of the model is that it features a SOE in which a neoclassical
banking system intermediates the inflows of foreign capital and firms have to finance
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their working capital. The most closely related paper is Pratap and Urrutia (2012),
who also explore the role of financial frictions in exacerbating existing inefficiencies and
explaining the drop in TFP. This paper is similar in that the working capital constraint
affects the purchase of intermediate goods. There are two main differences. First,
their model examines the effects of a change in domestic interest rate on output and
productivity. In addition, they do not explicitly model a bank as a financial intermedi-
ary. Another closely related paper is Oviedo (2003, 2005), who extends the neoclassical
growth model to include financial intermediation. His paper, however, focuses on the
interest-driven business cycles and volatility of domestic credits and capital flows.
This paper borrows a key insight from the literature that shows the financial condi-
tions and the availability of external financial capital in emerging countries are, to a large
extent, dependent on factors external to the domestic economy, such as world interest
rate. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993, 1996) study the capital inflows in Latin
America in the 1990s and find that much of the inflows were driven by factors external
to the region. Calvo and Mendoza (2000) study the likely scenario that international
investors follow the ‘market’ rather than assessing each country’s fundamentals. Uribe
and Yue (2006) investigate how emerging-country spreads respond to changes in the
world interest rate. They document that U.S. interest rate shocks explain about 20% of
movements in aggregate activity in emerging countries at business-cycle frequency. In
this paper, I build a model to demonstrate the effects of a change in world interest rate
and assess its plausibility to explain the effects of financial crises.
This paper also contributes to the literature on financial frictions and sudden stops
in emerging economies. Mendoza (2010) and Mendoza and Yue (2008) use financial
frictions as a device to amplify the economy’s aggregate response to a sequence of bad
realizations of exogenous TFP shocks. In my model, financial frictions can endogenously
generate a large fall in TFP, which is more in line with Pratap and Urrutia (2012). In
addition, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) propose modifying the standard model to introduce
a demand for working capital. Since firms have to pay for the use of factors of production
before getting their sale proceeds, the interest rate is part of the cost of employing inputs.
In their model, any output drop generated by an increase in interest rates is due to a
decline in the labor supply and equilibrium employment. In my paper, the financial
friction affects the purchase of intermediate goods instead of the wage bill.
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In what follows, Section 3.2 documents the empirical findings on the importance of a
banking sector in emerging economics, especially during sudden stop episodes. Section
3.3 introduces the model and derives equilibrium conditions for numerical analysis.
Section 3.4 presents a numerical exercise of the model: calibrating to the Mexican
economy before the 1995 crisis. It also reports results from the numerical experiment.
Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Findings
In emerging economies, does the banking sector play an important role during sudden
stop episodes? This section documents two major facts about the importance of banks
for the macroeconomic performance of emerging economies. A significant portion of
the domestic credits is provided by the banking sector. For example, 60% of domestic
credits was provided by banks in Korea during 1990s, while in Mexico it was 40%.
Moreover, a positive contemporaneous correlation between GDP and Bank loans was
seen in both Mexico and Argentina.
3.2.1 Domestic Credits Provided by Banks
The banking system is a central element in the process of financial intermediation in
most developing countries, and domestic capital markets play an almost insignificant
role. This fact has been documented by Gurley and Shaw (1960), who observe that
in the earlier stages of financial development, commercial banking is the main form of
intermediation. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) also show that private bonds
markets capitalization is around 4% of the GDP, and total private credit from financial
intermediaries is 20% of the GDP in low and lower-middle income countries.
Figure 3.1 shows the portion of domestic credits provided by banks for Mexico and
Korea. The proportion of domestic credits financed by banks in Mexico was over 40%
of the GDP in the 1990s. In particular, during sudden stops in 1994-1995, it went up to
almost 50%. A similar pattern is also seen in Korea, as bank loans accounted for 50%
of the GDP, which surged to about 60% during 1997-1998 sudden stops. Since banks
play an important role in emerging economies, when it is difficult to finance through
other channels, firms rely on banks even more during crisis.
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Figure 3.1: Domestic Credits Provided by Banks
(a) Mexico
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3.2.2 Bank Loans and GDP
Since the access to international borrowing and lending is the distinguishing characteris-
tic of open economies, the cost of borrowing affects the economic prosperity of emerging
countries in the short run. For instance, the negative correlation between interest rates
and overall economic activity in emerging countries has been documented by recent
research such as Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006). These studies
find that the correlation between interest rates and output is negative and may exceed
(in absolute value) 0.5 in emerging countries.
It is also not surprising to see the co-movement between bank loans and GDP, as
shown in Figure 3.2. For both Mexico and Argentina, the graph shows that the change
in GDP and the change in bank loans move together. This positive contemporaneous
correlation between GDP and Bank loans has been documented in the literature. Oviedo
(2003) investigates this co-movement between bank loans and GDP for Argentina and
finds a correlation equal to 0.64. Sharif (2010) uses a sample of 19 countries (both
emerging and advanced economies) to show that bank loan supply fluctuations are
associated with disturbances in GDP.
3.3 The Model
Consider a small open economy with four type of agents, namely, households, firms,
intermediate good producers and banks. Households do not have direct access to inter-
national financial markets and their assets are physical capital and bank loans. House-
holds own all banks and firms in the economy but perfect competition cuts down banks’
and firms’ profits to zero. The firm produces output by renting capital kt and buying
labor nt from households and purchasing intermediate goods from intermediate goods
producers. I introduce the financial friction as a working capital requirement for pro-
duction. The working capital constraint implies that every period the firm must hold
non-interest-bearing assets to finance a fraction θ of intermediate goods. All prices are
in terms of the final good.
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Figure 3.2: Bank Loans and GDP Co-Movement
(a) Mexico
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Consumers
The infinitely lived representative consumer is endowed with one unit of labor, which is
supplied inelastically. Each period, the consumer consumes the final good ct, saves/borrows
from banks lht , and invests in capital kt. The interest on bank loans is paid in advance
at domestic rate rlt. The consumer’s problem can be written as
max
{ct,lht ,kt+1}
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−σt − 1
1− σ , (3.3.1)
subject to the budge constraint
ct + xt + lht rlt ≤ wt + rkt kt +
(
lht − lht−1
)
, (3.3.2)
where the consumer’s source of resources includes net borrowing from banks
(
lht − lht−1
)
and labor and capital-rental income, which depend on the wage rate wt and the rental
rate of capital rkt . Resources are spent in consumption and investment, ct and xt,
respectively, and in interest payments, which depend on the amount borrowed, lht , and
the bank lending rate, rlt . Raising the stock of capital from kt at time t to kt+1 at time
t+ 1 requires incurring in adjustment costs whose size is controlled by the value of the
parameter φ. Let δ represent the depreciation rate. The law of motion of the capital
stock can then be written as:
xt = kt+1 − (1− δ) kt + φ2
(
kt+1 − kt
kt
)2
. (3.3.3)
Given initial conditions k0 and lh−1, the description of consumer’s problem is complete.
The optimality conditions include the budget constraint holding with equality and
β
(
ct+1
ct
)−σ
= 1− rlt, (3.3.4)
(
1− rlt
)(
rkt+1 + 1− δ + φ
(
kt+2 − kt+1
kt+1
)
kt+2
k2t+1
)
= 1 + φ
kt
(
kt+1 − kt
kt
)
. (3.3.5)
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The transitivity condition indicates that
lim
t→∞Et
[
c−σt
(
kt − lht
)]
= 0.
Equations (3.3.4) and (3.3.5) are the Euler equations for bank loans and capital,
respectively. It is interesting to note that the consumer’s budget constraint (3.3.2)
characterizes the case in which the interest rate is known and paid at the borrowing
time. This timing is adopted by Diaz-Gimenez, Prescott, Fitzgerald, and Alvarez (1992),
from whom this paper borrows the formulation of the banking problem below.
Firms
Competitive firms combine capital, labor and intermediate goods in a constant returns
to scale technology to produce a single final good, which is used for consumption, in-
vestment and the production of intermediate goods,
Yt =
(
kαt n
1−α
t
)ε
m1−εt .
The price of final good is used as the numeraire. Following Uribe and Yue (2006), the
production process is subject to a working capital constraint that requires firms to hold
non-interest-bearing assets to finance a fraction of the purchase of intermediate goods
each period,
ηt ≥ θpmt mt θ ≥ 0, (3.3.6)
where ηt denotes the amount of working capital held by the firm at the end of each
period t.
Assuming interest is paid in advance, let lyt denote the bank loans demanded by the
firm. The debt position of the firm evolves according to the following expression
lyt = l
y
t−1 + rltl
y
t − Yt + wtnt + rkt kt + pmt mt + pit − ηt−1 + ηt,
where pi denotes profits of firms distributed to consumers, and rltl
y
t represents the amount
of interest paid in advance. Rearrange the above equation to get
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(
1− rlt
)
lyt = l
y
t−1 − Yt + wtnt + rkt kt + pmt mt + pit − ηt−1 + ηt.
Define the firm’s total net liabilities at the end of period t as at = lyt − ηt. Then, we can
rewrite the above equation to get
(
1− rlt
)
at = at−1 − Yt + wtnt + rkt kt + pmt mt + pit + rltηt.
Substitute equation (3.3.6) to get
(
1− rlt
)
at = at−1 − Yt + wtnt + rkt kt + pmt
(
1 + θrlt
)
mt + pit.
The firm’s objective is to maximize the present discounted value of the stream of profits
distributed to its owners, i.e., the consumers. That is,
maxE
∞∑
t=0
βtpit.
Assume firms start out with no liabilities, a0 = 0, then an optimal plan consists of
holding no liabilities at all times (at = 0 ∀t ≥ 0), with distributed profits given by
pit = Yt − wtnt − rkt kt − pmt
(
1 + θrlt
)
mt.
It is clear from the optimal conditions below and the Cobb-Douglas production tech-
nology that one can conclude that profits are zero at all times (pit = 0 ∀t). The firm’s
problem can then be rewritten as
max
{kt,nt,mt}
Yt − wtnt − rkt kt − p˜mt mt,
where p˜mt = pmt
(
1 + θrlt
)
is the user price of the intermediate goods. Define p˜
m
t
pmt
= 1+θrlt
to be the wedge between producer price and the user price of intermediate goods. When
θ > 0, the working capital constraint acts like a tax on inputs. During sudden stops,
an increase in rlt will increase the wedge , which worsens the allocative inefficiency by
taking the production of intermediate goods further away from the optimal. The firm’s
optimality conditions are
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wt = ε (1− α) Yt
nt
rkt = αε
Yt
kt
mt = (1− ε) Yt
p˜mt
Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods producers transform m˜t units of the final goods into interme-
diate goods mt using a linear technology, i.e.,
mt = Amm˜t.
The intermediate goods producers’ problem can be written as
max
m˜t
pmt mt − m˜t,
which implies
pmt =
1
Am
.
Banks
The representative bank is the only domestic agent borrowing and lending in interna-
tional capital markets. It is subject to a reserve requirement and pays and charges
interest in advance. The bank’s static optimization problem consists of maximizing its
end-of-period assets:
max
{lt,st,bt}
lt + st − bt,
subject to a cash flow constraint, a reserve-requirement constraint, and non-negative
constraints, respectively,
lt
(
1− rlt
)
+ st + ηbbt + ηllt ≤ bt (1− rt) , ηb, ηl > 0
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st ≥ τbt,
lt, st, bt ≥ 0,
where lt stands for total loans, st for bank reserves, bt for bonds issued by the bank in
world financial markets, rt for the world interest rate, and τ for the reserve requirement
coefficient. Following Diaz-Gimenez, Prescott, Fitzgerald, and Alvarez (1992), there is
a constant cost, ηb, per unit of bond issued by the bank in the world financial markets,
and a constant cost, ηl, per unit of value loaned.
The bank finds it optimal to set the reserve requirement as equality, st = τbt.
The remaining optimality conditions imply that the spread is implicitly given by the
following expression
rlt = ηl +
rt + ηb
1− τ . (3.3.7)
This expression shows that the domestic interest rate rises with the reserve require-
ment coefficient and the intermediation costs ηb and ηl. Note that we have drlt/drt =
1/ (1− τ), so the bank acts as an amplification mechanism of world interest rate shocks
when τ > 0. Free access to the intermediation technology drives profits down to zero,
i.e., lt = (1− τ) bt.
Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of a sequence of state contingent
allocations for each consumer
{
ct, nt, kt+1, lht
}∞
t=0
; a sequence of contingent allocations
for each firm {kt, nt,mt}∞t=0 and for each intermediate goods producer {m˜t}∞t=0; a se-
quence of contingent allocations for each bank {lt, st, bt}∞t=0; and a sequence of prices{
rlt, r
k
t , wt, p
m
t , rt
}∞
t=0
such that,
1. The allocation
{
ct, nt, kt+1, lht
}∞
t=0
solves the representative consumer’s problem,
i.e., it maximizes the expected lifetime utility in (3.3.1) subject to budget con-
straint in (3.3.2) and the law of motion of capital in (3.3.3).
2. The allocation {kt, nt,mt}∞t=0 maximizes the representative firm’s profit in every
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period given the sequence of prices. Similarly, the allocation {m˜t}∞t=0 maximizes
the intermediate goods producer’s profit in every period.
3. The allocation {lt, st, bt}∞t=0 gives the bank maximized assets at the end of every
period subject to the cash flow constraint, the reserve-requirement constraint, and
non-negative constraints.
4. The following markets clear in every period:
(a) for the final good
Yt = ct + kt+1 − (1− δ) kt + φ2
(
kt+1 − kt
kt
)2
+ m˜t + ηbbt + ηllt +NXt.
In other words, final goods are used for consumption, capital investment,
intermediate goods production, paying for costs of bonds and loans by the
bank, and net export.
(b) for labor
nt = 1.
(c) for loans
lt = lht + l
y
t = lht + θpmt mt.
Macroeconomic Aggregates
GDP in this economy can be expressed as
GDPt = Yt − pmt mt
= wt + rkt kt.
The real GDP at constant prices can be defined as
RGDPt = Yt − pm0 mt,
and aggregate TFP can be expressed as
TFPt = RGDPtkαt .
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3.4 Numerical Analysis
3.4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match the key features of the Mexican economy on the eve
of the crisis. Table 3.1 gives the calibrated parameters and the statistics they match.
Some of these parameters deserve discussion. For the production function param-
eters, I use the input and output tables reported in Kehoe and Ruhl (2009). The two
ratios that suffice to identify production function parameters are
IntermediatesConsumption
V alueAdded
= 1− ε
ε
= 0.7793,
EmployeeCompensation
V alueAdded
= (1− α) ε
ε
= 0.62.
These two equations imply that ε = 0.562 and α = 0.4. The parameter θ, which
governs the amount of non-interest-bearing assets to finance a fraction of the purchase
of intermediate goods each period, is a key parameter of the model. Recall that when
θ > 0, the working capital constraint acts like a tax on inputs. The higher the value
of θ, the larger the wedge between producer price and user price of intermediate goods.
Following Pratap and Urrutia (2012), who estimate this parameter from firm level data
and NIPA data, I take the value of θ = 0.7. I set σ = 2, which gives an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of consumption of 0.5. The world interest rate, r, outside the
crisis is set to 5 percent, which is consistent with average world real interest rates. The
discount factor β is then set to 1/ (1 + r). As in Diaz-Gimenez, Prescott, Fitzgerald,
and Alvarez (1992), the bank reserve requirement τ is set to 0.01.
The parameters Am, lh0 , and φ are calibrated to the steady state. In particular,
I compute a steady state equilibrium for the model economy and jointly match two
targets: investment to output ratio and trade balance in 1994. I do not claim that the
Mexican economy was in a steady state in 1994, but calibrating to a steady state is a
means to get initial conditions for the numerical experiment in the next section. The
parameter for the adjustment cost of capital, φ, is calibrated to match the investment
to GDP ratio in 1995.
79
Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameters
Statistic Target Parameter Value
Ratio of Intermediates to Value Added 0.7793 ε 0.562
Share of Labor in Value Added 0.62 α 0.4
Fraction of Intermediates Financed by Working Capital 0.7 θ 0.7
Depreciation Rate δ 0.05
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 0.5 σ 2.0
World Interest Rate 0.05 r 0.05
Discount Factor β 0.952
Ratio of Investment to GDP 0.2 Am 0.2775
Ratio of Net Exports to GDP -0.05 lh0 -0.2486
Investment to GDP Ratio in 1995 0.15 φ 2.4
Bank Reserve Requirement τ 0.01
Bank per unit Fixed Cost for Loans ηl 0.049
Bank per unit Fixed Cost for Bond Issued ηb 0.01
3.4.2 Numerical Experiment
This section analyzes the effects of a change in the world interest rates on the Mexican
economy during and after sudden stops. I begin the experiment by calibrating the
economy to a steady state that matches the key features of the Mexican economy in 1994.
Then world interest rate is increased to 12.7 percent in 1995 and 8.2 percent in 1996, as
observed in the data. The purpose of this experiment is to examine the amplification
mechanism of a world interest rate shock through the bank’s intermediation.
Figure 3.3 shows the resulting response of aggregates after the world interest rate
shock. The top two panels give the fall in GDP and TFP. Since the labor supply is taken
as exogenous and working capital constraint only affects the purchase of intermediate
goods, I compare the model’s predictions of macroeconomic aggregates per worker. The
model generates a 5.9 percent fall in output, a larger fall compared to the data, which
has only 4.7 percent decrease. The TFP falls by 4.9 percent, accounting for 74 percent
of the observed decline in TFP in the data.
The intuition can be seen in equation (3.3.7): a shock to the world interest rate
increases the domestic interest rate. Since τ > 0, the bank acts as an amplification
mechanism of world interest rate shocks. Recall that the wedge between producer price
and the user price of intermediate goods, i.e., p˜
m
t
pmt
= 1 + θrlt, represents the allocative
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Figure 3.3: Numerical Results in the Model Economy. (cont.)
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inefficiency generated by the working capital constraint. An increase in domestic interest
rate rlt will take the production of intermediate goods further away from the optimal,
which worsens the allocative inefficiency. This shows up in the aggregate fall in TFP.
The model performs well in predicting the behavior of investment to GDP ratio. The
third graph of Figure 3.3 shows the model underpredicts a recovery of the investment
to GDP ratio. It changes from 20 percent to about 15 percent both in the model and
in the data. It recovers at a faster rate in the data, back to 20 percent in two years and
continues to show an increasing trend. In the model, however, it takes one more year
to return to normal and stagnates after that.
In addition, the model predicts a current account reversal, as shown in the fourth
graph of Figure 3.3. The model overpredicts the magnitude of the change. As interest
rate increases, the current account to GDP ratio increased to about 10 percent in 1995
and almost 30 percent in the following year in the model, as compared to about 5 percent
in the data. After the shock, as interest rate returns back to the pre-shock level, the
trade deficit worsens at a faster rate in the model.
The model also estimates that bank loans to the private sector decrease after the
interest rate hike, although the magnitude of the change is larger in the model. The
intuition is that after the world interest rate shock, it is harder for the bank to issue
bonds in the international capital market, therefore undermines its ability to lend to
domestic firms. Taking the steady state in 1994 as the base, the data shows that the
bank loans decrease to 88 percent in both 1995 and 1996, while the model predicts that
it decreases to about 73 percent in 1995 and 60 percent in 1996. Both model and data
show that the bank loans to private sector does not change much after that.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the role of a banking sector in a small open economy during
sudden stop episodes. First, I document the key facts in the data about the importance
of the banking sector in emerging countries. I find that a significant portion of the
domestic credits is provided by the banking sector. For example, in Korea, about 60%
of domestic credits was provided by banks in the 1990s, while in Mexico this number was
over 40%. Moreover, a positive contemporaneous correlation between GDP and Bank
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loans is seen in both Mexico and Argentina. Previous theories have largely focused
on the impact of an exogenous change in domestic interest rate on the economy (e.g.,
Neumeyer and Perri (2005)). Little attention has been drawn upon the impact of a
change in the world interest rate on the domestic interest rate and credit supply through
banks’ intermediation. In this paper, I explore the role of banks’ intermediation in
exacerbating the allocative inefficiency.
In particular, I build a small open economy model in which banks are the only
domestic agents with access to international capital markets. During sudden stops, a
shock to the world interest rate will decrease banks’ credit supply and raise domestic
interest rate on loans. Firms, with working capital financing needs, will experience
an increase in the cost of production. This worsens the misallocation and generates an
endogenous fall in TFP and output. The model is then calibrated to analyze the sudden
stop in Mexico in 1995 and subjected to an unexpected shock to the world interest rate.
The model generates a fall in output and can explain more than half of the fall in TFP.
The model also performs well in predicting the behavior of investment, bank loans, and
a current account reversal.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1
A1. Theory
A1.1 Proofs
Proposition 1
Proof. Using equations (1.2.12), (1.3.1) and (1.3.2), we can write a single equation which
determines ϕ∗ :
ΓAϕ∗
1
ε
ˆ ϕ∗
ϕ
dF (ϕ) =
(1 + ε
ε
− ΓA
) ˆ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕ
1
ε dϕ.
The left-hand side of this equation is monotonically increasing in ϕ∗, starting from 0
and strictly positive when ϕ∗ → +∞. The right-hand side is monotonically decreasing
in ϕ∗ and equal to 0 when ϕ∗ → +∞. By continuity, there exists a unique equilibrium.
Also, this equation shows that ϕ∗ does not depend on city population.
Lemma 1
Proof. From (1.2.12), we have
ϕ∗1
ϕ∗2
=
(Φ1
Φ2
)(
w1/Γ1
w2/Γ2
)ε
.
Equation (1.3.7), i.e., the condition that a team leader with productivity ϕ∗∗ is indiffer-
ent between locating in either city, together with the team leader’s income in (1.2.10),
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give us (Φ2
Φ1
) 1
ε
(Γ1
Γ2
)
=
(
R1
R2
)1−α
.
Using this equation and (1.3.6) we will have ϕ∗1 = ϕ∗2.
Lemma 2
Proof. Lemma 1 states that ϕ∗1 = ϕ∗2, i.e.,
Φ1
(
w1
Γ1
)ε
= Φ2
(
w2
Γ2
)ε
.
That is, (Φ1
Φ2
) 1
ε Γ2
Γ1
= w2
w1
.
From (1.2.10),
pi2 (ϕ)
pi1 (ϕ)
=
(Φ1
Φ2
) 1
ε Γ2
Γ1
= w2
w1
.
From (1.3.5), we know that w2 > w1, so pi2 (ϕ) > pi1 (ϕ) for all ϕ.
Proposition 2
Proof. From (1.3.5) and (1.3.6), we know that both wj and Rj depend on aggregate
productivity ratio, not individual team leader’s location choice. Individual team leaders
take both wage rates and housing prices as given. Now consider a team leader with
ϕ ≥ ϕ∗. Her income gain by locating to City 2 is
∆pi (ϕ) = pi2(ϕ)− pi1(ϕ)
= αε1 + εϕ
1
εY
[
Φ−
1
ε
2 Γ2 − Φ
− 1
ε
1 Γ1
]
> 0.
The second equality comes from equation (1.2.10). This income gain is positive, as
stated in Lemma 2.
∂∆pi(ϕ)
∂ϕ
= α1 + εϕ
−1+ 1
εY
[
Φ−
1
ε
2 Γ2 − Φ
− 1
ε
1 Γ1
]
> 0
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As ϕ increases, the income gain is larger by locating to City 2. Since ϕ∗∗ is the pro-
ductivity threshold at which the income gain exactly compensates for the high housing
price, any ϕ > ϕ∗∗ will give the team leader more income gain compared to the housing
price difference. Therefore, team leaders with ϕ ≥ ϕ∗∗ sort into City 2 and team leaders
with ϕ such that ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗∗ sort into City 1.
A1.2 The Baseline Model: the Analytical Solution of the Asymmetric
Equilibrium
In this section, I show that the asymmetric equilibrium in which City 2 has more skill-
intensive varieties of components can be summarized as a fixed-point problem of S.
Given the Pareto distribution of the productivity, F (ϕ), and the two cutoffs, ϕ∗ and
ϕ∗∗, the number of team leaders in each city, LE,j , and the aggregate productivity in
each city, Φj , can be written as functions of the two cutoffs, ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗.
LE,1 = Lϕδ
(
ϕ∗−δ − ϕ∗∗−δ
)
,
LE,2 = L
(
ϕ
ϕ∗∗
)δ
,
Φ1 =
[
δϕδL
1
ε − δ
(
ϕ∗∗
1
ε
−δ − ϕ∗ 1ε−δ
)]ε
,
Φ2 =
(
δϕδL
δ − 1ε
ϕ∗∗
1
ε
−δ
)ε
,
where I assume δ > 1ε .
Now consider the labor market clearing conditions. Labor in the whole economy is
supplied by all individuals with productivity less than ϕ∗. Let LW be the total number
of workers in both cities, i.e., LW = F (ϕ∗) = 1 −
(
ϕ
ϕ∗
)δ
. Then labor supply is equal
to wjλjLW in each city, where λj ∈ (0, 1) denotes the share of city j in workers.
Labor demand comes from two sources. Each team leader with productivity ϕ demands
l (ϕ) = x(ϕ)ϕ units of labor. In addition, final goods sectors in City 1 spend α (S − Γ1)Y
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on labor. Therefore, the labor market clearing condition in City 1 becomes
α (S − Γ1)Y + w1L
ˆ
x (ϕ)
ϕ
dF (ϕ) = w1λ1LW .
Using (1.2.8) and (1.2.9), this equation can be simplified to
αY
(
S − Γ1 + Γ11 + ε
)
= w1λ1LW .
Likewise, the labor market clearing condition in City 2 can be simplified to
αY
(
1− S − Γ2 + Γ21 + ε
)
= w2λ2LW ,
if we define Φ1 ≡
(
L
´ ϕ∗∗
ϕ∗ ϕ
1
ε dF (ϕ)
)ε
and Φ2 ≡
(
L
´∞
ϕ∗∗ ϕ
1
ε dF (ϕ)
)ε
. The labor market
clearing conditions, together with the free migration of workers, i.e., (1.3.6), give the
wage rates as:
w1 =
αY
(
S − Γ1 + Γ11+ε
)
λ1LW
,
w2 = w1
(
R2
R1
)1−α
,
λ1 =
S − Γ1 + Γ11+ε
S − Γ1 + Γ11+ε +
(
1− S − Γ2 + Γ21+ε
) (
R1
R2
)1−α , λ2 = 1− λ1.
Here wage rates are expressed in terms of Γj , LW , and the land rents ratio R2/R1. Since
Γj is a function of S and LW is a function of ϕ∗, wage rates are functions of S , ϕ∗ and
land rents ratio. The next step is to look at the land market clearing condition. Supply
of land is fixed at 1 in each city, while demand for land is from individuals.
ˆ
hj (ϕ) dϕ = 1
is the simple land market clearing condition for each city j. According to the Cobb-
Douglas preference, the land market clearing condition can be written as
Rj = (1− α)Yj ,
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where Yj is city j’s income excluding land rents:
Yj = L
ˆ
pij (ϕ) dF (ϕ) + wjλjLW .
Using (1.2.10), I can simplify this equation to
Yj =
αε
1 + εY Γj + wjλjLW .
Using the labor market clearing condition above, I can further rewrite this as
Y1 = αY S,
and
Y2 = αY (1− S) .
Therefore, the land rents ratio is
R1
R2
= Y1
Y2
= S1− S .
Given this, the wage rates wj and the spatial distribution of workers λj are now functions
of S and ϕ∗.
Now I show that the two productivity cutoffs ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗ are functions of S. The
first condition I will use is (1.2.12), which states that an individual with productivity
ϕ∗ is indifferent between being a team leader and a worker:
ϕ∗ = Φ1
(1 + ε
αε
w1
Y Γ1
)ε
.
Using the expressions for the aggregate productivity and the labor market clearing
condition, I have
ϕ∗ =
[
δϕδL
1
ε − δ
(
ϕ∗∗
1
ε
−δ − ϕ∗ 1ε−δ
)]ε 1 + εε S − Γ1 +
Γ1
1+ε
Γ1λ1L
(
1−
(
ϕ
ϕ∗
)δ)

ε
.
Γj and λj are functions of ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗, and S. Therefore, for a given S, this is one condition
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that gives the relationship between ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗. The second condition that I will use
is equation (1.3.7), which states that a team leader with productivity ϕ∗∗ is indifferent
between locating in City 1 and City 2:
pi1 (ϕ∗∗)
pi2 (ϕ∗∗)
=
(
R1
R2
)1−α
.
And this can be reduced to
(Φ2
Φ1
) 1
ε Γ1
Γ2
=
(
R1
R2
)1−α
.
Plugging in the aggregate productivities into the left side, this equation can be rewritten
as
ϕ∗∗
1
ε
−δ
ϕ∗
1
ε
−δ − ϕ∗∗ 1ε−δ
Γ1
Γ2
=
(
S
1− S
)1−α
,
which adds another condition to the relationship between ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗ for a given S.
Therefore, for a given S, there are two unknowns, ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗, and two equations. This
system of equations, if solved, implies that ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗ are obtained as functions of S.
In the above analysis, I take S as given. Now, I discuss the condition that can pin
down the value of S. The condition that determines the value of S is the comparative
advantage condition for sector S, which states that the unit production costs of final
good S in both cities are equalized:
C1(S)
C2(S)
=
(
w1
w2
)(Φ1
Φ2
)−γ(S)
= 1,
which can be rewritten as
(
S
1− S
)1−α(ϕ∗ 1ε−δ − ϕ∗∗ 1ε−δ
ϕ∗∗
1
ε
−δ
)−γ(S)ε
= 1.
Since both ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗ are functions of S, this is a single equation that determines the
value of S. Hence, the equilibrium can be summarized as a fixed-point problem of S.
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A2. Data and Estimations
A2.1 Data Description
Data Sources
The data on individuals’ education, wages, demographics, and industries in which they
are employed come from two sources. One source is from the public-use samples of the
decennial U.S. census and the annual American Community Survey (ACS) made avail-
able by IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder, and Sobek,
2010). I use the 2010 ACS sample. This sample is used to calculate the skill composi-
tion of each industry and serves as a robustness check for the skill distribution across
cities. The other source of data comes from the Current Population Survey (CPS),
a joint effort between the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Census Bureau.
This sample is used primarily to analyze the spatial skill distribution. The housing
price data come from the price indices constructed by Carrillo, Early, and Olsen (2014).
They post panels of annual price indices for housing services, other goods and services,
and all goods and services that cover the period 1982 through 2012. These price indices
are available for public use and are updated yearly. The data on sectoral employment
are taken from the 2010 County Business Patterns published by the U.S. Census Bureau.
Skill Distribution
I use the CPS data to calculate the fraction of highly skilled workers in each city. I use
the 2010 merged outgoing rotation groups (MORG) as provided by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER). The MORG are extracts of the basic monthly data of
CPS during the household’s fourth and eighth month in the survey, when usual weekly
hours/earnings are asked. I exclude those observations with missing values in education
and income variables. I study individuals whose highest education is some college (in-
cluding associate degrees), a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree, a professional degree
or a Ph.D. degree. Only those full-time, full-year employees are included in the sample,
defined as individuals who work at least 40 weeks during the year and usually work at
least 35 hours per week.
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Housing Prices
The housing price indices are taken from Carrillo, Early, and Olsen (2014). Their price
index panels are constructed by first creating cross-section price indices for the year 2000
in 380 areas (including metro and non-metro areas). Then they use the BLS time-series
price indices for particular metropolitan areas and other urban areas grouped according
to their region and size to create the panel of prices. I use the 2010 data. Their housing
price indices are based on data on the gross rent and numerous housing, neighborhood,
and location characteristics of about 170,000 units throughout the United States.
Sectoral Employment
County Business Patterns (CBP) provides annual statistics for businesses with paid
employees within the U.S., Puerto Rico, and Island Areas (Guam, American Samoa,
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) at
a detailed geography and industry level. CBP covers most NAICS industries exclud-
ing crop and animal production; rail transportation; National Postal Service; pension,
health, welfare, and vacation funds; trusts, estates, and agency accounts; private house-
holds; and public administration. CBP also excludes most establishments reporting
government employees. The 2010 CBP from the U.S. Census Bureau contains employ-
ment data for 6-digit NAICS industries across 348 MSAs. I use 21 three-digit NAICS
industries.
Skill Compositions by Industries
I use the 2010 ACS sample to calculate the skill composition of industries. I study
full-time, full-year employees, defined as individuals who work at least 40 weeks during
the year and usually work at least 35 hours per week. I consider U.S. born workers
with age between 25 and 55. I weight the sample using the person weight to ensure
that the sample is representative. The industries in which individuals are employed are
in the variable “indnaics”. The “indnaics” codes are three or four digit codes, some of
which include alphabetic characters. I extract the first three digit and match them with
standard NAICS codes. For each industry, I calculate the percent of college graduates,
defined as those with 4 years of college or more (i.e., variable “educ” is greater than or
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equals 10).
Per Capita Income
The data for per capita income in MSAs are taken from the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis (BEA). According to the reports, “per capita personal income is calculated as the
personal income of residents of a given area divided by the resident population of the
area.” In computing per capita personal income, BEA uses the Census Bureau’s annual
mid-year population estimates. Personal income is defined as the income received by
all persons from all sources. “It is the sum of net earnings by place of residence, rental
income of persons, personal dividend income, personal interest income, and personal
current transfer receipts. Personal income is measured before the deduction of personal
income taxes and other personal taxes and is reported in current dollars (no adjustment
is made for price changes).”
A2.2 Estimations
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Table A.1: Relationship of Housing Prices and Industrial Shares across Cities
Manufacturing Industries Coefficient Manufacturing Industries Coefficient
Food -1.810∗∗∗ Chemical 1.458∗
(0.390) (0.722)
Beverage and Tobacco Product -0.867 Plastic and Rubber Products -1.433∗∗∗
(0.782) (0.341)
Textile Mills -4.457∗∗ Nonmetallic Mineral Product -1.198∗∗∗
(1.266) (0.259)
Textile Product Mills -0.888 Primary Metal -4.065∗∗∗
(0.576) (0.619)
Apparel -0.859 Fabricated Metal -1.616∗∗∗
(0.585) (0.268)
Leather and Allied Product -2.939 Machinery -1.620∗∗∗
(1.400) (0.361)
Wood Product -2.459∗∗∗ Computer and Electronic Product 2.803∗∗∗
(0.407) (0.519)
Paper -2.732∗∗∗ Electrical Equip., App. & Comp. -1.924∗∗∗
(0.502) (0.483)
Printing and Support Activities 0.456 Transportation Equipment -2.168∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.522)
Petroleum and Coal Products -4.684∗∗ Furniture -0.638
(1.665) (0.400)
Miscellaneous 0.622
(0.317)
Observations 2612 Observations 2612
R-squared 0.293 R-squared 0.293
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A3: Cross-city Price Differences
Throughout this paper, I use the housing price as an approximation for urban cost.
Large cities have higher housing prices. What about prices of other goods? Can housing
price differences explain the price differences of all goods? One explanatory variable on
price differences across cities is population, which yields a common agglomerating force
across many New Economic Geography (NEG) models. While standard price indices
show a positive correlation between average prices and city sizes, however, as shown in
Handbury and Weinstein (2014), this correlation almost entirely disappears when they
compare transaction prices of identical products purchased in the same stores across
cities. They find that price level for food products actually falls with city size.
To test whether price differences across cities are mainly explained by housing price
differences, I use the ACCRA Cost of Living Index produced by The Council for Com-
munity and Economic Research. The ACCRA Cost of Living Index provides a useful
and reasonably accurate measure of cost of living differences between urban areas. Items
on which the Index is based have been carefully chosen to reflect the different categories
of consumer expenditures. Using the detailed component data for 54 individual goods
and services collected in the 209 U.S. cities in 2010, I find that a one log-unit rise in
city size is associated with a 3.4% increase in non-tradable price index but only a 1.2%
increase in tradable price index. One possible explanation is that rents are high in
large cities. Using the housing price index as an approximation for rent, I find that
controlling for rent differences across cities, the impact of population on non-tradable
price decreases by 56%. On the other hand, adding rent as an explanatory variable in
tradable prices makes population not statistically significant.
Therefore, I conclude that the cross-city prices of both tradable and non-tradable
goods can be explained by housing price differences. Including the housing price in the
regressions significantly reduces the effect of population on prices.
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Table A.2: Prices and Metropolitan Characteristics, 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log PT log PT log PN log PN
log MSA population 0.012∗∗∗ 0.005 0.034∗∗∗ 0.015∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
log Housing index 0.089∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.035)
Constant 4.445∗∗∗ 4.135∗∗∗ 4.157∗∗∗ 3.373∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.076) (0.097) (0.152)
Observations 209 209 209 209
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.148 0.086 0.231
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Appendix B
Chapter 2
Proofs
Lemma 1.
Proof. Rearranging (2.4.6) gives
exp
(
τs − τm
1− β S1
) S1ˆ
0
rexp
(
−τs − κβ1− β r
)
dr = α2
α1
S2ˆ
S1
rexp
(
−τm − κβ1− β r
)
dr
Given any S2 > 0, since τs > τm and κβ < τm < τs, Left side of the expression
above is increasing in S1. The right side is clearly decreasing in S1. Furthermore, the
left side is 0 for S1 = 0 while the right side is strictly positive, and the left side is
strictly positive for S1 = S2 while the right side is 0. Therefore, for each S2 > 0 there is
a unique S1 ∈ (0, S2) that ensures the above expression is satisfied. Observe also that
as S2 goes up and S1 does not change, the integral on the right side goes up. Since the
left side is increasing in S1, the equilibrium S1 must be strictly higher. Thus S1(S2) is
strictly increasing in S2.
Lemma 2.
Proof. Given any S > 0, since κ < τmα31−β+α3β , left side of (2.4.8) is decreasing in S2. From
Lemma 1, we know S1(S2) is increasing in S2, the right side is increasing in S2. The
rest of the proof is similar to the proof in Lemma 1.
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Proposition 1.
Proof. (i) This is immediate from the expressions of nm(0) and ns(0) in (2.4.9) and
(2.4.10).
(ii) Notice that qmF (0) = (1− β)Amnm(0)β
and qH(0) = qmF (0)exp
(
−α3τm−α3κβ−κ+κβα3(1−β) S2
)
.
(iii) It immediately follows from w(0) = βAmnm(0)β−1.
Proposition 2.
Proof. Recall that
nm(0) = P
2pi
(
1+α1
α2
) ´ SS2 rexp
(
− κ
α3
r
)
dr
exp
(
τs−τm
1−β S1
) ´ S1
0 rexp
(
− τs−κβ1−β r
)
dr
´ S
S2
rexp
(
−κ(1−α3)
α3
r
)
dr
.
The part 1/
(
exp
(
τs−τm
1−β S1
) ´ S1
0 rexp
(
− τs−κβ1−β r
)
dr
)
is clearly decreasing in S1 (and
S). From Lemma 2 in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2013), the ratio of integrals
Sˆ
S2
rexp
(
− κ
α3
r
)
dr/
Sˆ
S2
rexp
((
− κ
α3
+ κ
)
r
)
dr
is also decreasing in S. So nm(0) is decreasing in S. Similarly, ns(0) is also decreasing
in S. Rents qmF (0) = (1− β)Amnm(0)β and qH(0) = qmF (0)exp
(
−α3τm−α3κβ−κ+κβα3(1−β) S2
)
are also decreasing in S.
Lemma 3.
Proof. Since qH (S;Am, P ) = qH(0)exp
(
− κα3S
)
, the term exp
(
− κα3S
)
is decreasing in
S and from Proposition 2, holding Ai and P constant, qH(0) is decreasing in S. So
qH (S;Am, P ) is strictly decreasing in S.
Since qmF (0) = (1− β)Amnm(0)β and qH(0) = qmF (0)exp
(
−α3τm−α3κβ−κ+κβα3(1−β) S2
)
,
holding fixed S and P, qH(0) is proportional to Am and therefore qH (S;Am, P ) is
increasing in Am. And, holding fixed S and Am, qH(0) is increasing in P by Proposition
1. So qH (S;Am, P ) is increasing in P.
